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Senior Home Equity Rises Again to $10.6 Trillion

Homeowners 62 and older saw their housing wealth grow by some $405 billion (3.8 percent) during the fourth quarter of 2021 to a record $10.6 trillion according to the latest quarterly release of the NRMLA/RiskSpan Reverse Mortgage Market Index.

Historical Changes in Aggregate Senior Home Values Q! 2000 - Q4 2021

The NRMLA/RiskSpan Reverse Mortgage Market Index (RMMI) rose to 370.56, another all-time high since the index was first published in 2000. The increase in older homeowners’ wealth was mainly driven by an estimated $452 billion (3.7 percent) increase in home values, offset by a $44 billion (2.3 percent) increase in senior-held mortgage debt.

For a comprehensive commentary, please see NRMLA’s press release.

How RiskSpan Computes the RMMI

To calculate the RMMI, RiskSpan developed an econometric tool to estimate senior housing value, mortgage balances, and equity using data gathered from various public resources. These resources include the American Community Survey (ACS), Federal Reserve Flow of Funds (Z.1), and FHFA housing price indexes (HPI). The RMMI represents the senior equity level at time of measure relative to that of the base quarter in 2000.[1] 

A limitation of the RMMI relates to Non-consecutive data, such as census population. We use a smoothing approach to estimate data in between the observable periods and continue to look for ways to improve our methodology and find more robust data to improve the precision of the results. Until then, the RMMI and its relative metrics (values, mortgages, home equities) are best analyzed at a trending macro level, rather than at more granular levels, such as MSA.

[1] There was a change in RMMI methodology in Q3 2015 mainly to calibrate senior homeowner population and senior housing values observed in 2013 American Community Survey (ACS).

Surge in Cash-Out Refis Pushes VQI Sharply Higher

A sharp uptick in cash-out refinancing pushed RiskSpan’s Vintage Quality Index (VQI) to its highest level since the first quarter of 2019.

RiskSpan’s Vintage Quality Index computes and aggregates the percentage of Agency originations each month with one or more “risk factors” (low-FICO, high DTI, high LTV, cash-out refi, investment properties, etc.). Months with relatively few originations characterized by these risk factors are associated with lower VQI ratings. As the historical chart above shows, the index maxed out (i.e., had an unusually high number of loans with risk factors) leading up to the 2008 crisis.

RiskSpan uses the index principally to fine-tune its in-house credit and prepayment models by accounting for shifts in loan composition by monthly cohort.

Rising Rates Mean More Cash-Out Refis (and more risk)

As the following charts plotting the individual VQI components illustrate, a spike in cash-out refinance activity (as a percentage of all originations) accounted for more of the rise in overall VQI than did any other risk factor.

This comes as little surprise given the rising rate environment that has come to define the first quarter of 2022, a trend that is likely to persist for the foreseeable future.

As we demonstrated in this recent post, the quickly vanishing number of borrowers who are in the money for a rate-and-term refinance means that the action will increasingly turn to so-called “serial cash-out refinancers” who repeatedly tap into their home equity even when doing so means refinancing into a mortgage with a higher rate. The VQI can be expected to push ever higher to the extent this trend continues.

An increase in the percentage of loans with high debt-to-income ratios (over 45) and low credit scores (under 660) also contributed to the rising VQI, as did continued upticks in loans on investment and multi-unit properties as well as mortgages with only one borrower.

Population assumptions:

  • Monthly data for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
  • Loans originated more than three months prior to issuance are excluded because the index is meant to reflect current market conditions.
  • Loans likely to have been originated through the HARP program, as identified by LTV, MI coverage percentage, and loan purpose, are also excluded. These loans do not represent credit availability in the market as they likely would not have been originated today but for the existence of HARP.

Data assumptions:

  • Freddie Mac data goes back to 12/2005. Fannie Mae only back to 12/2014.
  • Certain fields for Freddie Mac data were missing prior to 6/2008.

GSE historical loan performance data release in support of GSE Risk Transfer activities was used to help back-fill data where it was missing.

An outline of our approach to data imputation can be found in our VQI Blog Post from October 28, 2015.

Data Source: Fannie Mae PoolTalk®-Loan Level Disclosure

EDGE: Cash-Out Refi Speeds 

Mortgage rates have risen nearly 200bp from the final quarter of 2021, squelching the most recent refinancing wave and leaving the majority of mortgage holders with rates below the prevailing rate of roughly 5% (see chart below). For most homeowners, it no longer makes sense to refinance an existing 30yr mortgage into another 30yr mortgage.

Vintage/Note Rate Distribution 30yr Conventional Mortgages

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But, as we noted back in February, the rapid rise in home prices has left nearly all households with significant, untapped gains in their household balance sheets. For homeowners with consumer debt at significantly higher rates than today’s mortgage rates, it can make economic sense to consolidate debt using a cash-out refi loan against their primary residence. As we saw during 2002-2003, cash-out refinancing can drive speeds on discount mortgages significantly higher than turnover alone. Homeowners can also become “serial cash-out refinancers,” tapping additional equity multiple times.  

In this analysis, we review prepayment speeds on cash-out refis, focusing on discount MBS, i.e., mortgages whose note rates are equal to or below today’s prevailing rates. 

The volume of cash-out refis has grown steadily but modestly since the start of the pandemic, whereas rate/term refis surged and fell dramatically in response to changing interest rates. Despite rising rates, the substantial run-up in home prices and increased staffing at originators from the recent refi boom has left the market ripe for stronger cash-out activity. 

The pivot to cash-out issuance is evidenced by the chart below, illustrating how the issuance of cash-out refi loans (the black line below) in the first quarter of this year was comparable with issuance in the summer of 2021, when rates near historic lows, while rate/term refis (blue line) have plunged over the same period. 

Quarterly Issuance of FN/FH Mortgages

With cash-out activity set to account for a larger share of the mortgage market, we thought it worthwhile to compare some recent cash-out activity trends. For this analysis, the graphs consist of truncated S-curves, showing only the left-hand (out-of-the-money) side of the curve to focus on discount mortgage behavior in a rising rate environment where activity is more likely to be influenced by serial cash-out activity. 

This first chart compares recent performance of out-of-the money mortgages by loan purpose, comparing speeds for purchase loans (black) with both cash-out refis (blue) and rate/term refis (green). Notably, cash-out refis offer 1-2 CPR upside over rate/term refis, only converging to no cash out refis when 100bp out of the money.[1] 

S-curves by Loan Purpose

Next, we compare cash-out speeds by servicer type, grouping mortgages that are serviced by banks (blue) versus mortgages serviced by non-bank servicers (green). Non-bank servicers produce significantly faster prepay speeds, an advantage over bank-serviced loans for MBS priced at a discount. 

Cash-out Refi Performance by Servicer Type

Finally, we drill deeper into the faster non-bank-serviced discount speeds for cash-out refis. This chart isolates Quicken (red) from other non-bank servicers (green). While Quicken’s speeds converge with those of other non-banks at the money, Quicken-serviced cash-out refis are substantially faster when out of the money than both their non-bank counterparts and the cash-out universe as a whole.[2]

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Cash out Refi Performance, by Servicer

We suspect the faster out-of-the-money speeds are being driven by serial cash-out behavior, with one servicer in particular (Quicken) encouraging current mortgage holders to tap home equity as housing prices continue to rise. 

This analysis illustrates how pools with the highest concentration of Quicken-serviced cash-out loans may produce substantially higher out-of-the-money speeds relative to the universe of non-spec pools. To find such pools, users can enter a list of pools into the Edge platform and simultaneously filter for both Quicken and cash-out refi. The resultant query will show each pool’s UPB for this combination of characteristics. 

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[1] For this analysis, we focused mortgages aged 18 to 48 months, with FICO above 700, LTV less than or equal to 80, and loan size greater than or equal to 250k. Other cuts are available. Please see us for details. 

[2] For this analysis, we removed points with less than 1000 observations to reduce statistical noise. 

EDGE: Recent Performance of GNMA RG Pools

In early 2021, GNMA began issuing a new class of custom pools with prefix “RG.” These pools are re-securitizations of previously delinquent loans which were repurchased from pools during the pandemic.[1] Loans in these pools are unmodified, keeping the original rate and term of the mortgage note. In the analysis below, we review the recent performance of these pools at loan-level detail. The first RG pools were issued in February 2021, growing steadily to an average rate of $2B per month from Q2 onward, with a total outstanding of $21 billion. 

 
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The majority of RG issuance has included loans that are two to seven years seasoned and represent a consistent 2-3% of the total GNMA market for those vintages, dashed line below.

Distribution of RG Loans by Age

Coupons of RG pools are primarily concentrated between 3.0s through 4.5s, with the top-10 Issuers of RG pools account for nearly 90% of the issuance.

EDGE - GNMA RG POOL PERFORMANCE

Below, we compare speeds on GNMA RG pools under various conditions. First, we compare speeds on loans in RG pools (black) versus same-age multi-lender pools (red) over the last twelve months. When out of the money, RG pools are 4-5 CPR slower than comparably aged multi-lender pools but provide a significantly flatter S-curve when in-the-money.

GN RG VS Multi-lender S-Curve

Next, we plot the S-curve for all GNMA RG loans with overlays for loans that are serviced by banks (green) and non-banks (blue). Bank-serviced RG loans prepay significantly slower than non-banks by an average of 9 CPR weighted across all incentives. Further, this difference is caused by voluntary prepays, with buyouts averaging a steady 4% CBR, plus or minus 1 CBR, for both banks and non-banks with no discernable difference between the two (second graph). GNMA RG S-curves GNMA_RG_Buyouts-graph

Finally, we analyzed the loan-level transition matrix by following each RG loan through its various delinquency states over the past year. We note that the transition rate from Current to 30-day delinquent for RG loans is 1.6%, only marginally worse than that of the entire universe of GNMA loans at 1.1%. RG loans transitioned back from 30->Current at similar rates to the wider Ginnie universe (32.3%) and the 30->60 transition rate for RG loans was marginally worse than the Ginnie universe, 30.8% versus  24.0%.[2]

Monthly Transition Rates for Loans in GNMA RG Pools: EDGE-GNMA-RG-Pool-Perform-Current-State In summary, loans in RG pools have shown a substantial level of voluntary prepayments and comparatively low buyouts, somewhat unexpected especially in light of their recent delinquency. Further, their overall transition rates to higher delinquency states, while greater than the GNMA universe, is markedly better than that of reperforming loans just prior to the outbreak of COVID.

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[1] For a more detailed description of the RG pool criteria, GNMA’s original memorandum can be found here.

[2] These transition rates have been stable over different time periods. The dollar-weighted average transition rates over the last year closely match the rates over the prior six months.

Asset Managers Improving Yields With Resi Whole Loans

An unmistakable transformation is underway among asset managers and insurance companies with respect to whole loan investments. Whereas residential mortgage loan investing has historically been the exclusive province of commercial banks, a growing number of other institutional investors – notably life insurance companies and third-party asset managers – have shifted their attention toward this often-overlooked asset class.

Life companies and other asset managers with primarily long-term, risk-sensitive objectives are no strangers to residential mortgages. Their exposure, however, has traditionally been in the form of mortgage-backed securities, generally taking refuge in the highest-rated bonds. Investors accustomed to the AAA and AA tranches may understandably be leery of whole-loan credit exposure. Infrastructure investments necessary for managing a loan portfolio and the related credit-focused surveillance can also seem burdensome. But a new generation of tech is alleviating more of the burden than ever before and making this less familiar and sometimes misunderstood asset class increasingly accessible to a growing cadre of investors.

Maximizing Yield

Following a period of low interest rates, life companies and other investment managers are increasingly embracing residential whole-loan mortgages as they seek assets with higher returns relative to traditional fixed-income investments (see chart below). As highlighted in the chart below, residential mortgage portfolios, on a loss-adjusted basis, consistently outperform other investments, such as corporate bonds, and look increasingly attractive relative to private-label residential mortgage-backed securities as well.

Nearly one-third of the $12 trillion in U.S. residential mortgage debt outstanding is currently held in the form of loans.

And while most whole loans continue to be held in commercial bank portfolios, a growing number of third-party asset managers have entered the fray as well, often on behalf of their life insurance company clients.

Investing in loans introduces a dimension of credit risk that investors do need to understand and manage through thoughtful surveillance practices. As the chart below (generated using RiskSpan’s Edge Platform) highlights, when evaluating yields on a loss-adjusted basis, resi whole loans routinely generate yield.

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In addition to higher yields, whole loans investments offer investors other key advantages over securities. Notably:

Data Transparency

Although transparency into private label RMBS has improved dramatically since the 2008 crisis, nothing compares to the degree of loan-level detail afforded whole-loan investors. Loan investors typically have access to complete loan files and therefore complete loan-level datasets. This allows for running analytics based on virtually any borrower, property, or loan characteristic and contributes to a better risk management environment overall. The deeper analysis enabled by loan-level and property-specific information also permits investors to delve into ESG matters and better assess climate risk.

Daily Servicer Updates

Advancements in investor reporting are increasingly granting whole loan investors access to daily updates on their portfolio performance. Daily updating provides investors near real-time updates on prepayments and curtailments as well as details regarding problem loans that are seriously delinquent or in foreclosure and loss mitigation strategies. Eliminating the various “middlemen” between primary servicers and investors (many of the additional costs of securitization outlined below—master servicers, trustees, various deal and data “agents,” etc.—have the added negative effect of adding layers between security investors and the underlying loans) is one of the things that makes daily updates possible.

Lower Transaction Costs

Driven largely by a lack of trust in the system and lack of transparency into the underlying loan collateral, private-label securities investments incur a series of yield-eroding transactions costs that whole-loan investors can largely avoid. Consider the following transaction costs in a typical securitization:

  • Loan Data Agent costs: The concept of a loan data agent is unique to securitization. Data agents function essentially as middlemen responsible for validating the performance of other vendors (such as the Trustee). The fee for this service is avoided entirely by whole loan investors, which generally do not require an intermediary to get regularly updated loan-level data from servicers.
  • Securities Administrator/Custodian/Trustee costs: These roles present yet another layer of intermediary costs between the borrower/servicer and securities investors that are not incurred in whole loan investing.
  • Deal Agent costs: Deal agents are third party vendors typically charged with enhancing transparency in a mortgage security and ensuring that all parties’ interests are protected. The deal agent typically performs a surveillance role and charges investors ongoing annual fees plus additional fees for individual loan file reviews. These costs are not borne by whole loan investors.
  • Due diligence costs: While due diligence costs factor into loan and security investments alike, the additional layers of review required for agency ratings tends to drive these costs higher for securities. While individual file reviews are also required for both types of investments, purchasing loans only from trusted originators allows investors to get comfortable with reviewing a smaller sample of new loans. This can push due diligence costs on loan portfolios to much lower levels when compared to securities.
  • Servicing costs: Mortgage servicing costs are largely unavoidable regardless of how the asset is held. Loan investors, however, tend to have more options at their disposal. Servicing fees for securities vary from transaction to transaction with little negotiating power by the security investors. Further, securities investors incur master servicing fees which is generally not a required function for managing whole loan investments.

Emerging technology is streamlining the process of data cleansing, normalization and aggregation, greatly reducing the operational burden of these processes, particularly for whole loan investors, who can cut out many of these intermediary parties entirely.

Overcoming Operational Hurdles

Much of investor reluctance to delve into loans has historically stemmed from the operational challenges (real and perceived) associated with having to manage and make sense of the underlying mountain of loan, borrower, and property data tied to each individual loan. But forward-thinking asset managers are increasingly finding it possible to offload and outsource much of this burden to cloud-native solutions purpose built to store, manage, and provide analytics on loan-level mortgage data, such as RiskSpan’s Edge Platform supporting loan data management and analytics. RiskSpan solutions make it easy to mine available loan portfolios for profitable sub-cohorts, spot risky loans for exclusion, apply a host of credit and prepay scenario analyses, and parse static and performance data in any way imaginable.

At an increasing number of institutions, demonstrating the power of analytical tools and the feasibility of applying them to the operational and risk management challenges at hand will solve many if not most of the hurdles standing in the way of obtaining asset class approval for mortgage loans. The barriers to access are coming down, and the future is brighter than ever for this fascinating, dynamic and profitable asset class.

EDGE: Extension Protection in a Rising Rate Environment

With the Fed starting their tightening cycle and reducing balance sheet, mortgage rates have begun rising. Since late summer, 30-year conforming rates have risen more than 100bp, with 75bp of that occurring since the end of December. The recent flight-to-quality rally has temporarily eased that, but the overall trend remains in place for higher mortgage rates.

With this pivot, mortgage investors have switched from focusing on prepayment protection to mitigating extension risk. In this post, we offer analysis on extension risk and turnover speeds for various out-of-the-money Fannie and Freddie cohorts.[1]

In the chart below, we first focus on out-of-the-money prepays on lower loan balance loans. For this analysis, we analyzed speeds on loans that were 24 to 48 months seasoned. We further grouped the loan balance stories into meta-groups, as the traditional groupings of “85k-Max”, etc, showed little difference in out-of-the-money speeds. When compared to loans with balances above 250k, speeds on lower loan balance loans were a scant 1-2 CPR faster than borrowers with larger loan balances, when prevailing rates were 25bp to 100bp higher than the borrower’s note rate.

We next compare borrowers in low FICO pools, high LTV pools, and 100% investor pools. Speeds on low-FICO pools (blue) offer some extension protection due to higher involuntary speeds. At the other end, loans in 100% investor pools were dramatically slower than non-spec pools when out-of-the money.

Finally, we look at the behavior of borrowers in non-spec pools segregated by loan purpose, again controlling for loan age. Borrowers with refi loans pay significantly faster than purchase loans when only slightly out-of-the money. As rates continue to rise, refi speeds converge to purchase loans at 75bp out of the money and pay slower when 75-100bp out of the money, presumably due to a stronger lock-in effect.

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We also separated these non-spec borrowers by originators, grouping the largest banks and non-bank originators together. Out-of-the-money speeds on refi loans were significantly faster for loans originated by non-bank originators (blue and green) versus those originated by banks (red and orange). Speeds on purchase loans were only 1-2 CPR faster for non-banks versus banks and were omitted from this graph for readability.

In the current geopolitical climate, rates may continue to drop over the short term. But given the Fed’s tightening bias, it’s prudent to consider extension risk when looking at MBS pools, in both specified and non-specified pools.

[1] For investors interested in GNMA analysis, please contact RiskSpan

EDGE: The Fed’s MBS, Distribution and Prepayments

Since the Great Financial Crisis of 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has been the largest and most influential participant in the mortgage-backed securities market. In the past 14 years, the Fed’s holdings of conventional and GNMA pools has grown from zero to $2.7 trillion, representing roughly a third of the outstanding market. With inflation spiking, the Fed has announced an end to MBS purchases and will shift into balance-sheet-reduction mode. In this short post, we review the Fed’s holdings, their distribution across coupon and vintage, and their potential paydowns as rates rise.

The New York Fed publishes its pool holdings here. The pools are updated weekly and have been loaded into RiskSpan’s Edge Platform. The chart below summarizes the Fed’s 30yr Fannie/Freddie holdings by vintage and net coupon.

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We further categorize the Fed’s holdings by vintage and borrower note rate (gross WAC) at the loan level. Using loan-level data (rather than weighted-average statistics published on Fed-held Supers or their constituent pools [1]) provides a more accurate view of the Fed’s distribution of note rates and hence prepayment exposure.

Not surprisingly, the recent and largest quantitative easing has left the Fed holding MBS with gross WACs below the current mortgage rate. Roughly 85% of the mortgages held by the Fed are out-of-the-money, and the remaining in-the-money mortgages are several years seasoned. These older pools are beginning to exhibit burnout, with the sizable refinancing wave over the last two years having limited these moderately seasoned loans mainly to borrowers who are less reactive to savings from refinancing.

With most of the Fed’s portfolio at below-market rates and the remaining MBS moderately burned out, market participants expect the Fed’s MBS runoff to continue to slow. At current rates, we estimate that Fed paydowns will continue to decline and stabilize around $25B per month in the second quarter, just shy of 1% of its current MBS holdings.

With these low levels of paydowns, we anticipate the Fed will need to sell MBS if they want to make any sizable reduction in their balance sheet. Whether the Fed feels compelled to do this, or in what manner sales will occur, is an unsettled question. But paydowns alone will not significantly reduce the Fed’s holdings of MBS over the near term.

[1] FNMA publishes loan-level data for pools securitized in 2013 onward. For Fed holdings that were securitized before 2013, we used FNMA pool data.  

EDGE: Measuring the Potential for Another Cash-out Refi Wave

With significant home price gains over the last two years, U.S. homeowners are sitting on vast, mostly untapped wealth. Nationally, home prices are up an aggregate of 28% over the last two years, with some regions performing even better. But unlike other periods of strong home price gains, cash-out refinancings lagged overall refinancings during the pandemic rate-rally. In this short article, we look at cash-out refinancings over time, and their potential impact on prepayments, especially on discount cohorts.

A historical perspective

In the early 2000s, mortgage rates fell nearly 200bp, triggering a massive refinancing wave as well as a rally in home prices that lasted well into 2005.

Edge Housing Gains and Cash out Refis

During this early millennium rally, the market saw significant cash-out refi activity with homeowners borrowing at then-historically low rates to free up cash. The market even saw refinancing activity in mortgages with note rates below the prevailing market rate. In 2002, CPRs on some discount cohorts hit the low to middle teens, which many participants attributed to cash-out refinancing. Resetting a mortgage 50 basis points higher can nevertheless often lead to overall lower debt servicing when borrowers use cash-out refis to consolidate auto loans, credit cards and other higher-rate unsecured borrowings.[1] In the early 2000s, this cash-out refinancing activity led to overall faster speeds and a higher S-curve for out-of-the-money cohorts. How does 2002-03 cash-out refi activity compare to today? In the early 2000s, issuance of cash-out mortgages, as a percentage of the total market, varied between 1% and 2.5% of the outstanding mortgage universe each month.

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Since the onset of the pandemic, that figure has not experienced the same kind of spike, hovering around just 0.9%.[2]

In 2002-03, most of these cash-out borrowers refinanced into lower rates, but a sufficient number took out mortgages at same or higher rates to drive prepayments on discount MBS into the low teens CPR (see black s-curve below). By comparison, out-of-the money speeds today (the blue s-curve) are approximately 4 CPR slower.

The nearly 30% rally in home prices during the pandemic has further strengthened a solid housing market. Today’s borrowers have substantial equity in their homes, leaving many homeowners with untapped borrowing power, shown in the market-implied LTVs below. From an origination standpoint, mortgage lenders have sufficient capacity to support any uptick in cash-out refinancing as rate-term refinancing volumes decline.

Any growth in cash-out refi issuance is likely to come on loans with note rates close to the prevailing mortgage rate. If a homeowner needs to generate cash for a large purchase, it can make economic sense to refinance an existing loan into a new loan with rates as much as 25bp or 50bp higher, rather than incur even higher (and shorter-term) interest rates on credit cards or personal loans. Therefore, any uptick in cash-out refinancing will likely have a larger effect on prepayment speeds for MBS that are either at-the-money or slightly out-of-the-money. This uptick may mitigate some of the extension risk in near-discount mortgages, especially in non-spec cohorts where refinancing frictions are lower. While the past two years have seen substantial changes, positive and negative, in overall refinancings, cash-out refis have largely not followed suit. But a significant home price rally, coupled with strong economic activity and excess originator capacity, could change that trend in the upcoming year.

[1] See RiskSpan for examples.

[2] To compute this statistic, we summed the originations of cash-out refi mortgages and divided by the total size of mortgages extant.

How Has the First “Social” RMBS Performed – And What’s So Social About It?

Now that six months have passed since Angel Oak issued AOMT 2021-2 – hailed as the first U.S. non-Agency RMBS to qualify as a social bond [1] – we can compare preliminary collateral performance to other deals. Angel Oak’s 2021-1, from the same shelf and vintage – but without the social bond distinction – provides an apt control group. To set the stage for this performance comparison, we’ll first reexamine the compositional differences – and significant overlap – between the two collateral pools. What we will show:

  • The pool compositions are highly overlapping, with marginally greater risk concentrations of self-employment and alternative documentation in the social securitization, and the same WA (weighted average) coupon
  • The social collateral has outperformed the benchmark credit-wise in the early going
  • The social deal has exhibited some lock-in, i.e., slower refinancing, providing some very preliminary evidence that the borrowers are indeed underserved, and that investors may be rewarded if the social collateral’s credit performance holds
  • However, the credit mix of the social collateral has drifted riskier – more so than the benchmark – meaning the strong early credit performance of the social deal could reverse, and ongoing surveillance is warranted

New Loans or New Label?

The Social AOMT 2021-2 Is Similar to AOMT 2021-1

Figure 1 shows AOMT 2021-1 vs. 2021-2 in the Collateral Comparison screen of Edge, RiskSpan’s data and analytics platform. Clearly, the two pools were similar at origination, with highly overlapping distributions of FICO, LTV, and DTI and many other similar metrics.

So What’s Different – And How Different Is It?

The distinguishing principle of a social bond under Angel Oak’s framework is that it provides affordable home mortgages to those who often can’t get them because they don’t qualify under the automated underwriting processes of traditional lenders because of the exceptional nature of their sources of income. [2]

Angel Oak says the specific characteristic hindering the borrowers in the AOMT 2021-2 deal is self-employment. [3] Self-employed borrowers make up 94.4% of the pool (with a median annual income of $227,803) [4], up marginally from 86.5% in the 2021-1 deal [5]. As Figure 1 shows, the proportion of low documentation by balance was up from 87.5% in 2021-1 to 97.5% in 2021-2.

Also, Figure 1 shows that 2021-2’s FICOs and LTVs are slightly worse on average with slightly more tail risk, and the cash-out proportion is slightly riskier.

Compensating marginally for 2021-2 are slightly lower ARM proportions (0 vs. 0.8% for 2021-1), lower WA. DTI, and a higher proportion of owner-occupied (90% vs. 85%), which many view as credit-positive.

In summary, RiskSpan calculates 1.83 average risk layers per loan for the social 2021-2, slightly higher than 1.78 for 2021-1.

Notably the WA coupons for the two pools are the same.

Figure 1: Edge’s Collateral Comparison Screen Showing AOMT 2021-1 (aka AOAK 2101) vs. 2021-2 (aka AOAK 2102) at OriginationGraphSource: CoreLogic, RiskSpan

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In summary, it seems that most – though perhaps not all – of the loans that qualified for AOMT 2021-2 would have qualified for AOMT 2021-1 and other non-QM deals.

Kroll’s new issue report seems to acknowledge that what is new about 2021-2 is mostly the formal emphasis on the social benefits of the loans made, and less a change in the kinds of loans made: “While many of [Angel Oak’s] lending programs overlap meaningfully with other non-QM lender’s offerings, the actions taken by AOCA generally indicate management’s attention to ESG related matters. Specifically, AOCA’s SBF puts focus on the impact that credit availability for underserved borrowers can have.” [4]

A skeptical interpretation of the overlap between 2021-1 and the social 2021-2 collateral would be that the social claim is largely hollow. Another way of looking at it is that a financial market participant is finally taking credit for good work it has been largely doing all along. Angel Oak itself seems to take this latter view, saying, “Since 2011, AOCA has been implementing ESG principles within its non-qualified mortgage (non-QM) origination and securitization program to provide access to residential credit for underserved borrowers.” [2]

Either way, logical hypotheses would be that collateral performance will be similar between 2021-2 and 2021-1, with -2 showing (a) slightly more credit trouble and (b) slightly less able to refinance. Regarding the second hypothesis, logically it should challenge the premise that the deal serves underserved borrowers if its borrowers can refinance just as readily as others.

Early Performance of the Social Bonds

Let’s see how AOMT’s social 2021-2 has performed as benchmarked to 2021-1 during the first six and seven months, respectively, of available data.

Better Delinquency Trend Than the Benchmark

As Figure 2 shows, delinquencies opened higher for the social 2021-2 but have mostly cured. By contrast, delinquencies have trended up for 2021-1. So far, Angel Oak’s social origination is outperforming its non-social contemporary from a credit standpoint.

Figure 2: AOMT 2021-2 Delinquencies Began Higher, Have Mostly Cured; AOMT 2021-1’s Delinquencies Have Trended Up 60 day-plus delinquency share over time, AOMT 2021-2 vs AOMT 2021-1 Source: CoreLogic, RiskSpan

Significantly Better Credit Performance by the Social DSCR Investor Loans

A small slice of the deals driving outsized delinquencies in 2021-1 are the DSCR-based investor loans (Figure 3). In the social 2021-2, delinquencies among this cohort are zero. We plot the spreads at origination (SATO) of this cohort alongside delinquencies to show that the DSCR loans in 2021-2 had lower credit spreads by about 20bps. Perhaps the investor loans pooled into 2021-2 were managed to higher standards for DSCR, rent rolls or other attributes (their LTVs and ages are similar).

Figure 3: Delinquencies – and SATOs – Are Lower Among DSCR-Based Investor Loans in AOMT 2021-2 60 day-plus delinquency share and WA SATOs over time, AOMT 2021-2 vs. AOMT 2021-1, includes Detailed Doc Type = DSCR Investor Cash Flow.Source: CoreLogic, RiskSpan

Ironically, The Full Doc Loans Are the Social Deal’s Blemish

The slice of full doc loans in the social 2021-2 have a much lower WA FICO than the low doc loans in the same deal or either the low or full doc loans in 2021-1 (see the green dotted line in Figure 4). Correspondingly, these full doc loans have the highest delinquent share among the four cohorts in Figure 4 (green solid line). If this pattern holds, it highlights the viability of using tradeoffs to manage down the overall credit risk represented by loans with risky attributes.

Figure 4: AOMT 2021-2’s Full Doc Loans Are the Most Delinquent Doc Cohort from Either Deal 60 day-plus delinquency share and WA FICOs over time, AOMT 2021-2 vs. AOMT 2021-1 and Full Doc vs. Low Doc Source: CoreLogic, RiskSpan

Slower Refinances Than the Benchmark

While credit performance has been better for the social deal than we might expect, voluntary prepays so far (Figure 5) support our hypothesis that the social deal should prepay slower. Note that we plot voluntary prepays over loan age, and that all loans from this recent non-QM vintage have similar (and highly positive) refinance incentive. If the social deal’s refinances remain slower, that accomplishes two significant things: 1) it supports the claim that the social borrowers are indeed underserved; 2) if combined with sustained credit performance, it provides support in terms of financial risk and return for the price premiums that social bonds tend to command.

Figure 5: AOMT 2021-2 Is Refinancing Slower CRR over loan age, AOMT 2021-2 vs. AOMT 2021-1, July 2021-January 2022 Source: CoreLogic, RiskSpan

The Relative Refinance Slowness Is From the Large Balance Loans

The overall slowness of the social collateral in Figure 5 is driven by large loans. Figure 6 shows that, among loans <$417K, the prepay patterns of 2021-1 and 2021-2 are similar, while among loans > $417K, the prepays of 2021-2 are consistently slower. This may suggest that large loans with complex sources of income are particularly hard to underwrite.

Figure 6: The Social Deal’s Low-Balance Loans Refi Similar to Benchmark, But Large Balances Have Been Slower CRR over loan age, AOMT 2021-2 vs. AOMT 2021-1, bucketed by loan size, July 2021-January 2022 Source: CoreLogic, RiskSpan

 

Updated Collateral Mix

The Social Deal’s Credit Mix Has Drifted Riskier, Warranting Ongoing Monitoring

While the early performance of the social collateral is positive, Figure 7 provides reason for concern and ongoing watchfulness. Since origination, the composition of the social 2021-2 has drifted riskier in all respects except slight improvements in WA DTI and WA LTV. Its LTV tails, WA FICO, and FICO tails; proportions of cash-out, low doc, non-owner-occupied; and average overall risk layers are all somewhat riskier.

The drift for 2021-1 has been more mixed. Like 2021-2, it is safer with respect to WA DTI and WA LTV. Unlike 2021-2, it is also safer with respect to LTV tails, FICO tails, and cash-out proportion. Like 2021-2, it is riskier with respect to WA FICO; proportions of low doc and non-owner-occupied; and average overall risk layers.

We will continue to monitor whether this composition drift drives differential performance going forward.

Figure 7: Edge’s Collateral Comparison Screen Showing AOMT 2021-1 (aka AOAK 2101) vs. 2021-2 (aka AOAK 2102) updated to the Current Factor DateGraphSource: CoreLogic, RiskSpan

Using Edge, you can examine prepay or credit performance of loan subsets defined by any characteristics, and generate aging curves, time series, or S-curves.

REQUEST A DEMO OR TRIAL

[1] https://angeloakhomeloans.com/angel-oak-capital-advisors-delivers-first-to-market-non-agency-social-bond-securitization/

[2] https://www.issgovernance.com/file/spo/spo-20210408-angel-oak.pdf

[3]  https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20210517005728/en/Angel-Oak-Capital-Advisors-Delivers-First-to-Market-Non-Agency-Social-Bond-Securitization

[4]  https://www.kbra.com/documents/report/48093/angel-oak-mortgage-trust-2021-2-aomt-2021-2-new-issue-report

[5]  https://www.fitchratings.com/research/structured-finance/angel-oak-mortgage-trust-2021-1-us-rmbs-02-03-2021

Improving MSR Pricing Using Cloud-Native Loan-Level Analytics (Part II)

Improving MSR Pricing Using Cloud-Native Loan-Level Analytics (Part II)

  1. MSR investors are more exposed to acute climate risk than whole loan or securities investors are. MSR investors are not in a favorable position to recoup cash flows lost to climate disruptions.
  2. Climate risk can be acute, chronic, or transitional. Each affects MSR values in a different way.
  3. Integrating climate scenario analysis into traditional credit and prepayment modeling – both of which are critical to modeling MSR cash flows and pricing — requires a loan-by-loan approach.
  4. Climate risk cannot be adequately expressed or modeled using a traditional rep-line approach.

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