Linkedin    Twitter   Facebook

Get Started
Log In

Linkedin

Articles Tagged with: Climate Risk

The NRI: An Emerging Tool for Quantifying Climate Risk in Mortgage Credit

Climate change is affecting investment across virtually every sector in a growing number of mostly secondary ways. Its impact on mortgage credit investors, however, is beginning to be felt more directly.

Mortgage credit investors are investors in housing. Because housing is subject to climate risk and borrowers whose houses are destroyed by natural disasters are unlikely to continue paying their mortgages, credit investors have a vested interest in quantifying the risk of these disasters.

To this end, RiskSpan is engaged in leveraging the National Risk Index (NRI) to assess the natural disaster and climate risk exposure of mortgage portfolios.

This post introduces the NRI data in the context of mortgage portfolio analysis (loans or mortgage-backed securities), including what the data contain and key considerations when putting together an analysis. A future post will outline an approach for integrating this data into a framework for scenario analysis that combines this data with traditional mortgage credit models.

The National Risk Index

The National Risk Index (NRI) was released in October 2020 through a collaboration led by FEMA. It provides a wealth of new geographically specific data on natural hazard risks across the country. The index and its underlying data were designed to help local governments and emergency planners to better understand these risks and to plan and prepare for the future.

The NRI provides information on both the frequency and severity of natural risk events. The level of detailed underlying data it provides is astounding. The NRI focuses on 18 natural risks (discussed below) and provides detailed underlying components for each. The severity of an event is broken out by damage to buildings, agriculture, and loss of life. This breakdown lets us focus on the severity of events relative to buildings. While the definition of building here includes all types of real estate—houses, commercial, rental, etc.—having the breakdown provides an extra level of granularity to help inform our analysis of mortgages.

The key fields that provide important information for a mortgage portfolio analysis are bulleted below. The NRI provides these data points for each of the 18 natural hazards and each geography they include in their analysis.

  • Annualized Event Frequency
  • Exposure to Buildings: Total dollar amount of exposed buildings
  • Historical Loss Ratio for Buildings (Bayesian methods to derive this estimate, such that every geography is covered for its relevant risks)
  • Expected Annual Loss for Buildings
  • Population estimates (helpful for geography weighting)

Grouping Natural Disaster Risks for Mortgage Analysis

The NRI data covers 18 natural hazards, which pose varying degrees of risk to housing. We have found the framework below to be helpful when considering which risks to include in an analysis. We group the 18 risks along two axes:

1) The extent to which an event is impacted by climate change, and

2) An event’s potential to completely destroy a home.

Earthquakes, for example, have significant destructive potential, but climate change is not a major contributor to earthquakes. Conversely, heat waves and droughts wrought by climate change generally do not pose significant risk to housing structures.

When assessing climate risk, RiskSpan typically focuses on the five natural hazard risks in the top right quadrant below.

Immediate Event Risk versus Cumulative Event Risk

Two related but distinct risks inform climate risk analysis.

  1. Immediate Event Analysis: The risk of mortgage delinquency and default resulting directly from a natural disaster eventhome severely damaged or destroyed by a hurricane, for example.  
  2. Cumulative Event Risk: Less direct than immediate event risk, this is the risk of widespread home price declines across an entire area communities because of increasing natural hazard risk brought on by climate changeThese secondary effects include: 
    • Heightened homebuyer awareness or perception of increasing natural hazard risk,
    • Property insurance premium increases or areas becoming ‘self-insured, 
    • Government policy impacts (e.g., potential flood zone remapping), and 
    • Potential policy changes related to insurance from key players in the mortgage market (i.e., Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, FHFA, etc.). 

NRI data provides an indication of the probability of immediate event occurrence and its historic severity in terms of property losses. We can also empirically observe historical mortgage performance in the wake of previous natural disaster events. Data covering several hurricane and wildfire events are available.

Cumulative event risk is less observable. A few academic papers attempt to tease out these impacts, but the risk of broader home price declines typically needs to be incorporated into a risk assessment framework through transparent scenario overlays. Examples of such scenarios include home price declines of as much as 20% in newly flood-exposed areas of South Florida. There is also research suggesting that there are often long term impacts to consumer credit following a natural disaster 

Geography Normalization

Linking to the NRI is simple when detailed loan pool geographic data are available. Analysts can merge by census tract or county code. Census tract is the more geographically granular measure and provides a more detailed analysis.

For many capital markets participants, however, that level of geographic specific detail is not available. At best, an investor may have a 5-digit or 3-digit zip code. Zip codes do not directly match to a given county or census tract and can potentially span across those distinctions.

There is no perfect way to perform the data link when zip code is the only available geographic marker. We take an approach that leverages the other data on housing stock by census tract to weight mortgage portfolio data when multiple census tracts map to a zip code.

Other Data Limitations

The loss information available represents a simple historical average loss rate given an event. But hurricanes (and hurricane seasons) are not all created equal. The same is true of other natural disasters. Relying on averages may work over long time horizons but could significantly underpredict or overpredict loss in a particular year. Further, the frequency of events is rising so that what used to be considered 100 year event may be closer to a 10 or 20 year event. Lacking data about what losses might look like under extreme scenarios makes modeling such events problematic.

The data also make it difficult to take correlation into account. Hurricanes and coastal flooding are independent events in the dataset but are obviously highly correlated with one another. The impact of a large storm on one geographic area is likely to be correlated with that of nearby areas (such as when a hurricane makes its way up the Eastern Seaboard).

The workarounds for these limitations have limitations of their own. But one solution involves designing transparent assumptions and scenarios related to the probability, severity, and correlation of stress events. We can model outlier events by assuming that losses for a particular peril follow a normal distribution with set standard deviations. Other assumptions can be made about correlations between perils and geographies. Using these assumptions, stress scenarios can be derived by picking a particular percentile along the loss distribution.

A Promising New Credit Analysis Tool for Mortgages

Notwithstanding its limitations, the new NRI data is a rich source of information that can be leveraged to help augment credit risk analysis of mortgage and mortgage-backed security portfolios. The data holds great promise as a starting point (and perhaps more) for risk teams starting to put together climate risk and other ESG analysis frameworks.


Houston Strong: Communities Recover from Hurricanes. Do Mortgages?

The 2017 hurricane season devastated individual lives, communities, and entire regions. As one would expect, dramatic increases in mortgage delinquencies accompanied these events. But the subsequent recoveries are a testament both to the resilience of the people living in these areas and to relief mechanisms put into place by the mortgage holders.

Now, nearly a year later, we wanted to see what the credit-risk transfer data (as reported by Fannie Mae CAS and Freddie Mac STACR) could tell us about how these borrowers’ mortgage payments are coming along.

The timing of the hurricanes’ impact on mortgage payments can be approximated by identifying when Current-to-30 days past due (DPD) roll rates began to spike. Barring other major macroeconomic events, we can reasonably assume that most of this increase is directly due to hurricane-related complications for the borrowers.

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

The effect of the hurricanes is clear—Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Houston all experienced delinquency spikes in September. Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands then experienced a second wave of delinquencies in October due to Hurricanes Irma and Maria.

But what has been happening to these loans since entering delinquency? Have they been getting further delinquent and eventually defaulting, or are they curing? We focus our attention on loans in Houston (specifically the Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land Metropolitan Statistical Area) and Puerto Rico because of the large number of observable mortgages in those areas.

First, we look at Houston. Because the 30-DPD peak was in September, we track that bucket of loans. To help us understand the path 30-DPD might reasonably be expected to take, we compared the Houston delinquencies to 30-DPD loans in the 48 states other than Texas and Florida.

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

Of this group of loans in Houston that were 30 DPD in September, we see that while many go on to be 60+ DPD in October, over time this cohort is decreasing in size.

Recovery is slower than the non-hurricane-affected U.S. loans, but persistent. The biggest difference is that a significant number of 30-day delinquencies in the rest of the country loans continue to hover at 30 DPD (rather than curing or progressing to 60 DPD) while the Houston cohort is more evenly split between the growing number loans that cure and the shrinking number of loans progressing to 60+ DPD.

Puerto Rico (which experienced its 30 DPD peak in October) shows a similar trend:

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

To examine loans even more affected by the hurricanes, we can perform the same analysis on loans that reached 60 DPD status.

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

Here, Houston’s peak is in October while Puerto Rico’s is in November.

Houston vs. the non-hurricane-affected U.S.:

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

Puerto Rico vs. the non-hurricane-affected U.S.:

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

In both Houston and Puerto Rico, we see a relatively small 30-DPD cohort across all months and a growing Current cohort. This indicates many people paying their way to Current from 60+ DPD status. Compare this to the rest of the US where more people pay off just enough to become 30 DPD, but not enough to become Current.

The lack of defaults in post-hurricane Houston and Puerto Rico can be explained by several relief mechanisms Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have in place. Chiefly, disaster forbearance gives borrowers some breathing room with regards to payment. The difference is even more striking among loans that were 90 days delinquent, where eventual default is not uncommon in the non-hurricane affected U.S. grouping:

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

And so, both 30-DPD and 60-DPD loans in Houston and Puerto Rico proceed to more serious levels of delinquency at a much lower rate than similarly delinquent loans in the rest of the U.S. To see if this is typical for areas affected by hurricanes of a similar scale, we looked at Fannie Mae loan-level performance data for the New Orleans MSA after Hurricane Katrina in August 2005.

As the following chart illustrates, current-to-30 DPD roll rates peaked in New Orleans in the month following the hurricane:

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

What happened to these loans?

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

Here we see a relatively speedy recovery, with large decreases in the number of 60+ DPD loans and a sharp increase in prepayments. Compare this to non-hurricane affected states over the same period, where the number of 60+ DPD loans held relatively constant, and the number of prepayments grew at a noticeably slower rate than in New Orleans.

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

The remarkable number of prepayments in New Orleans was largely due to flood insurance payouts, which effectively prepay delinquent loans. Government assistance lifted many others back to current. As of March, we do not see this behavior in Houston and Puerto Rico, where recovery is moving much more slowly. Flood insurance incidence rates are known to have been low in both areas, a likely suspect for this discrepancy.

While loans are clearly moving out of delinquency in these areas, it is at a much slower rate than the historical precedent of Hurricane Katrina. In the coming months we can expect securitized mortgages in Houston and Puerto Rico to continue to improve, but getting back to normal will likely take longer than what was observed in New Orleans following Katrina. Of course, the impending 2018 hurricane season may complicate this matter.

—————————————————————————————————————-

Note: The analysis in this blog post was developed using RiskSpan’s Edge Platform. The RiskSpan Edge Platform is a module-based data management, modeling, and predictive analytics software platform for loans and fixed-income securities. Click here to learn more.

 


Get Started
Log in

Linkedin   

risktech2024