Linkedin    Twitter   Facebook

Get Started
Log In

Linkedin

Articles Tagged with: Mortgage and Structured Finance Markets

What is SOFR and What Does it Mean For You?

What is SOFR

The Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) is a broad measure of the cost of borrowing cash overnight collateralized by U.S. Treasury securities. As such, it will reflect an economic cost of lending and borrowing relevant to the wide array of market participants active in the financial markets. However, SOFR is fundamentally different from LIBOR. SOFR is an overnight, secured, nearly risk-free rate, while LIBOR is an unsecured rate published at several different maturities. It is a fully transaction-based rate incorporating data from transactions across three segments of the U.S. Treasury Repo market (tri-party repo, General Collateral Finance (GCF) repo and bilateral repo cleared through the Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (FICC)).[1]

The ARRC noted the need for replacement rate spreads due to the differences between rates:

Because LIBOR is unsecured and therefore includes an element of bank credit risk, it is likely to be higher than SOFR and prone to widen when there is severe credit market stress. In contrast, because SOFR is secured and nearly risk-free, it is expected to be lower than LIBOR and may stay flat (or potentially even tighten) in periods of severe credit stress. Market participants are considering certain adjustments, referenced in the fallback proposal as the applicable ‘Replacement Benchmark Spread’, which would be intended to mitigate some of the differences between LIBOR and SOFR.[2]

While the ARRC selection of SOFR as the U.S. replacement rate of choice is final, their selection is only a recommendation that LIBOR be replaced with SOFR. This creates a precarious outlook for the transition: financial institutions have to choose to take the transition seriously, and if they choose to employ rates other than SOFR, the transition could be longer and more complicated than many expect. That said, the cost benefit of choosing a different alternative reference rate is increasingly difficult to justify. With the selection of SOFR as the recommended rate, the New York Fed established an industry standard and did so in a lengthy process that included market participants and a public comment period. They also began publishing SOFR regularly on April 3, 2018.[3]
 

Additional steps taken by governmentsponsored enterprises (GSEs) have initiated the momentum in building out the SOFR market. In July 2018, Fannie Mae issued the first SOFR-denominated securities, leading the way for other institutions who have since followed suit.  In November 2018, the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) issued $4bn in debt tied to SOFR. The action was taken to support liquidity and help demonstrate SOFR demand to develop the SOFR market for the approximately 7,000 member institutions – banks, credit unions, and insurers – who are in the process of transitioning away from LIBOR.[4] CME Group, a derivatives and futures exchange companylaunched 3-month and 1-month SOFR futures contracts in 2018.[5] All of these steps taken to build out the market create a strong start for a rate that is already more stable than LIBORthe transaction volume underpinning SOFR rates is around $750billodaily, compared to USD LIBOR’s estimated $500 million.[6]

The ARRC has begun publishing guidance for fallback language and in the fall of 2018 published consultations on recommended language for floating rate notes and syndicated business loans.[7][8]

These initial steps to build out the necessary SOFR market put the United States ahead of the ARRC transition plan schedule and position the market well to begin SOFR implementation. However, a successful transition will require extensive engagement from other institutions. Affected institutions need to begin their transition now in order to make the gradual transition in time for the 2021 deadline.

Who Does This Transition Affect?

The transition affects any institutions that hold contracts, products, or tools that reference LIBOR and will not reach full maturity or phase out before the end of 2021. 

What Actions Do Affected Institutions Need to Take?

  1. Establish a Sponsor and Project Team:  Affected institutions need to take a phased approach to the transition away from LIBOR. Because of the need for continuous oversight, they should begin by identifying an executive sponsor and establishing a project team. The team should be responsible for all transition-related activities across the organization, including assessment of exposure and the applicability of alternative reference rates where necessary, planning the steps and timing of transition, and coordinating the implementation of transition away from LIBOR.
  2. Conduct an Impact Assessment:  The first task of the project team is to complete an impact assessment to determine the institution’s LIBOR exposure across all financial products and existing contracts that mature after 2021, as well as any related models and business processes (including third-party vendors and data providers). Regarding contracts, the team should identify and categorize all variants of legacy fallback language in existing contracts. Additionally, the assessment should analyze the risk of the LIBOR transition to the institution’s basis and operational risk and across financial holdings.
  3. Mitigate Risks:  Using results from the LIBOR exposure assessment, the project team should develop a plan running through 2021 to prioritize transition activities in a way that best mitigates risk on LIBOR exposure, and communicates the transition activities to employees and clients with ample time for them to learn about and buy into the transition objectives. 

  4. Prepare new products and tools linked to alternative reference rates: This mitigates risk by limiting the number of legacy exposures that will still be in effect in 2021 and creates a clear direction for transition activities. New references may include financial instruments and products, contract language, models, pricing, risk, operational and technological processes and applications to support the new rates.
  5. Develop and Implement Transition Contract Terms: In legacy contracts that will mature after 2021, the project team will need to amend contracts and fallback language. The ARRC has begun to provide guidance for amendments or transitions related to some financial products and will continue to publish legacy transition guidance as it fulfills its mandate. Where necessary, products must move to ARRs.
  6. Update Business Processes: Based on the impact assessment, various business processes surrounding the management of interest rate changes, including those built into models and systems will require updating to accommodate the switch away from LIBOR. For new products utilizing the new index rate, procedures, processes and policies will need to be established and tested before rollout to clients.

  7. Manage Change and Communicate:  The project team will need to develop educational materials explaining specific changes and their impacts to stakeholders. The materials must be distributed as part of an outreach strategy to external stakeholders, including clients and investors, as well as rating agencies and regulatory bodies. The outreach strategy should help to ensure that the transition message is consistent and clear as it is communicated from executives and board members to operational personnel, other stakeholders and outer spheres of influence. 

  8. Test: Financial institutions will want to prepare for regulatory oversight by testing business processes in advance. Regulators may look for documentation of the processes used to identify and remediate LIBOR risks and any risk exposure that has not been completed.

1Federal Reserve Bank of New York. “Secured Overnight Financing Rate Data.” https://apps.newyorkfed.org/markets/autorates/sofr, Accessed November 2018.

Federal Reserve Bank of New York. “ARRC Consultation: Regarding more robust LIBOR fallback contract language for new originations of LIBOR syndicated business loans,” 24 September 2018. https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/Microsites/arrc/files/2018/ARRC-Syndicated-Business-Loans-Consultation.pdf, Accessed November 2018.

Federal Reserve Bank of New York. “Statement Introducing the Treasury Repo Reference Rates,” 3 April 2018. https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/opolicy/operating_policy_180403, Accessed November 2018.

4Guida, Victoria. “Federal Home Loan Banks boost LIBOR replacement with $4B debt issuance,” Politico. 13 November 2018. https://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/13/federal-home-loan-banks-libor-replacement-939489, Accessed November 2018.

CME Group. “Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) Futures.” https://www.cmegroup.com/trading/interest-rates/secured-overnight-financing-rate-futures.html, Accessed November 2018.

Graph: LSTA. “LIBOR and the Loan Market.” 24 April 2018. https://www.lsta.org/uploads/DocumentModel/3523/file/libor-in-the-loan-market_042418.pdf, Accessed November 2018.

Federal Reserve Bank of New York. “ARRC Consultation: Regarding more robust LIBOR fallback contract language for new issuances of LIBOR floating rate notes,” 24 September 2018. https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/Microsites/arrc/files/2018/ARRC-FRN-Consultation.pdf, Accessed November 2018.

Federal Reserve Bank of New York. “ARRC Consultation: Regarding more robust LIBOR fallback contract language for new originations of LIBOR syndicated business loans,” 24 September 2018. https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/Microsites/arrc/files/2018/ARRC-Syndicated-Business-Loans-Consultation.pdf, Accessed November 2018.

16 Federal Reserve Bank of New York. “Minutes,” Alternative Reference Rates Committee (ARRC). 31 October 2017. https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/microsites/arrc/files/2017/October-31-2017-ARRC-minutes.pdf, Accessed November 2018.


What is LIBOR and why is it Going Away?

What is LIBOR?

The London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is a reference rate, and over time since the 1980s has become the dominant rate for most adjustable-rate financial products. A group of banks (panel banks) voluntarily report the estimated transaction cost for unsecured bank-to-bank borrowing terms ranging from overnight to one year for various currencies.

The number of currencies and maturities has fluctuated over time, but LIBOR is currently produced across seven maturities: overnight/spot, one week, one month, two months, three months, six months and one year. LIBOR rates are produced for the American dollar, the British pound sterling, the European euro, Japanese yen, and the Swiss franc, resulting in the current 35 rates.[1][2] The aggregated calculations behind the rates are supposed to reflect the average of what banks believe they would have to pay to borrow currency or the cost of funds for a specified period. However, because the contributions are voluntary, and the rates submitted are a subjective assessment of probable cost, LIBOR indices do not reflect actual transactions.

LIBOR rates became heavily used in trading in the 1980s, officially launched by the British Bankers Association (BBA) in 1986 and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), the independent UK body that regulates financial firms, since April 2013.[3] Until 2014, LIBOR was developed by a group of UK banks, under the BBA. The Intercontinental Exchange Benchmark Administration (ICE) took over administration of the rate in 2014 in an effort to give the rate credible internal governance and oversight – ICE created third-party oversight, which resolved the BBA’s inherent conflict of interest in generating a sound rate while also protecting its member institutions.

Why is LIBOR Going Away?

International investigations into LIBOR began in 2012 and revealed widespread efforts to manipulate the rates for profit, with issues discovered as far back as 2003. The investigations resulted in billions of dollars in fines for involved banks globally and jail time for some traders. More recently, in October 2018, a Deutsche Bank trading supervisor and derivatives trader were convicted of conspiracy and wire fraud in relation to LIBOR rigging.[4]

The scandal challenged the validity of LIBOR and deterred panel banks from continuing their involvement in LIBOR generation. Because LIBOR rates are collected by voluntary contribution, the number of banks contributing, and therefore also the number of underlying transactions, have waned in recent years. In July 2017, Andrew Bailey, Chief Executive of the FCA announced that LIBOR rates would only be formally sustained by the FCA through the end of 2021, due to limited market activity around LIBOR benchmarks and the declining contributions of panel banks. The FCA has negotiated with current panel banks for their agreement to continue contributing data towards LIBOR rate generation through the end of 2021.[5]

Even without the challenge of collecting contributions from panel banks, many regulators have expressed concerns with the representative scale of LIBOR and related issues of instability. The market of products referencing LIBOR dwarfs the transactions that LIBOR is supposed to represent. The New York Fed approximated that underlying transaction volumes for USD LIBOR range from $250 million to $500 million, while exposure for USD LIBOR as of the end of 2016 was nearly $200 trillion.[6]

What Solution are Regulators Proposing?

In 2014, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (New York Fed) convened the Alternative Reference Rates Committee (ARRC) in order to identify best practices for alternative reference rates and contract robustness, develop an adoption plan, and create an implementation plan with metrics of success and a timeline. The Committee was created in the wake of the LIBOR scandals, with the intention of verifying some alternatives, though no formal change in LIBOR was announced until 2017. The Federal Reserve reconstituted this board to include a broader set of market participants in March 2018 with the updated objective of developing a transition plan away from LIBOR and providing guidance on how affected parties can address risks in legacy contracts language that reference LIBOR.

In June 2017, the ARRC announced the Secure Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) as its recommended alternative rate, and the New York Fed began publishing the rate on April 3, 2018. In October 2017, the ARRC adopted a “Paced Transition Plan” with specific steps and timelines designed to encourage use of its recommended rate.[7]

The transition away from LIBOR impacts most institutions dealing in floating rate instruments. Stay updated with the RiskSpan blog for future LIBOR updates.

Footnotes

1 Kiff, John. “Back to Basics: What is LIBOR?” International Monetary Fund. Accessed November 2018. December 2012. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2012/12/basics.htm, Accessed November 2018.

“LIBOR – current LIBOR interest rates.” Global Rates. https://www.global-rates.com/interest-rates/libor/libor.aspx, Accessed November 2018.

Bailey, Andrew. “The Future of LIBOR.” Financial Conduct Authority. 27 July 2017. https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/the-future-of-libor, Accessed November 2018

4 “Two Former Deutsche Bank Traders Convicted for Role in Scheme to Manipulate a Critical Global Benchmark Interest Rate.” U.S. Department of Justice press release. 17 October 2018. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-former-deutsche-bank-traders-convicted-role-scheme-manipulate-critical-global-benchmark, Accessed November 2018.

Bailey, Andrew. “The Future of LIBOR.” Financial Conduct Authority. 27 July 2017. https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/the-future-of-libor, Accessed November 2018.

6 Alternative Reference Rates Committee. “Second Report.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York. March 2018. https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/Microsites/arrc/files/2018/ARRC-Second-report, Accessed November 2018.

Alternative Reference Rates Committee. Federal Reserve Bank of New York. https://www.newyorkfed.org/arrc/index.html, Accessed November 2018.


A Primer on HECM Loans

In September, RiskSpan announced the addition of Ginnie Mae’s loan-level Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (“HECM”) dataset to the Edge platform. The dataset contains over 330,000 HECM loans with origination dates from 2000 to 2018 and reporting periods from August 2013 to October 2018.   This post is a primer on HECM loans, the HMBS securities they collateralize, and the structure of the new dataset.  What is a HECM?  HECMs are FHA-insured reverse mortgages that provide people 62 and older with cash payments or a line of credit in exchange for equity in their homes. Borrowers are not liable to make any payments on HECM balances until the house ceases to be their primary residence. In contrast to traditional mortgages that amortize down over time, reverse mortgage balances usually grow over time as accrued interest is added to the loan. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insures HECM lenders against default and loss and is paid a mortgage insurance premium in return.   Because borrowers do not make principal and interest payments, the concept of HECM default differs from that of traditional forward mortgages. HECM default most commonly occurs when borrowers fail to keep current on property tax payments and insurance premiums or otherwise jeopardize the lender’s lien position on the property.   Initial loan-to-value (LTV) ratios for HECMs average between 60% and 70% to allow for the balance to grow over time (taking into account borrower age and interest rate). The number of borrowers is arguably a more important factor when predicting HECM performance than when predicting traditional mortgage performance. Because reverse mortgages do not become due until all borrowers have left the property, reverse mortgages with multiple borrowers tend to have longer tenures—and consequently run a higher risk of growing beyond the point where the balance and accrued interest are supported by the underlying property’s value.   Like traditional mortgages, HECM interest rates may be fixed or adjustable. Fixed-rate HECMs disburse a single, initial advance, while adjustable-rate HECMs combine a line of credit or monthly advance with an initial advance. Figure 1 (below), which was constructed using data from the newly available dataset, illustrates a steady increase in the share of ARM loans since 2013.     hecm loan composition through time Figure 1    One net result of this trend is fewer one-time lump-sum distributions and more line-of-credit (LOC) distributions over time. LOCs give borrowers access to a source of funds that they can draw upon as needed. While LOCs constitute (by far) the most common type of HECM, two other loan types—“term” and “tenure”—also occupy the HECM landscape.   “Term” loans provide monthly payments for a set period of time. “Tenure” loans provide monthly payments for as long as the borrower lives in the home as primary residence. The lender receives principal, interest and possibly a share of the home appreciation upon expiry of the fixed term (in the case of term loans) or upon borrower’s death or move-out (in the case of either loan type).   The dominance of the LOC loan type relative to term and tenure HECMs is depicted in Figure 2, below.    hecm loan purpose through time Figure 2   Fannie Mae had traditionally functioned as the primary investor in reverse mortgages for most of these loans’ 25-year existence. Since 2009, however, Fannie Mae has significantly scaled back its reverse mortgage portfolio, leaving the majority of the reverse mortgages to be picked up by the Ginnie Mae HMBS market.     What is a HMBS?  HECM loans are pooled into HECM mortgage-backed securities (HMBS) within the Ginnie Mae II MBS program. HMBS are made up of a pool of participations in the HECM loans. A participation in a HECM loan is a pro-rata share of the loan that is securitized in a HMBS. As explained above, many HECM loans are structured as a line of credit, which allows borrowers to draw on their lines as needed. When these draws occur, the drawn-down loans become a smaller pro-rata share of the loan and the participation balance doesn’t change.   HMBS participations have a mandatory repurchase clause requiring a lender to buy back all the participations of a HECM loan when its LTV reaches 98%. For HECM loans, LTV is calculated as a proportion of the current HECM balance against the maximum claim amount.   As of June 2018, participation unpaid balance stood at approximately $56.18 billion with 11,380,452 active participations. Figures 3 and 4, below, show the trend of participation composition (by number of participations and UPB) over time. These reflect the shift toward ARM lines of credit (and away from fixed-rate lump sum disbursements) illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.   HECM Figure 3     participation upb composition through time Figure 4    HMBS Dataset  Ginnie Mae provides two monthly loan-level files related to the HECMs that collateralize its HMBS offering. One of these files contains fixed-rate and annually adjusting rate loans, and the other contains monthly adjusting rate loans. Because individual security participations are spread across several different pools (often with several column values repeating for a single loan) working with this dataset can be challenging.  An example of a single loan spread across multiple security participations is illustrated in the table below. Note that for a single loan ID, the current UPB and Max Claim Amount columns are repeated for each participation.   

Loan ID  Current HECM UPB  Max Claim Amount  Participation UPB 
1000033608  260,784.73  365,000.00  860.70 
1000033608  260,784.73  365,000.00  321.87 
1000033608  260,784.73  365,000.00  12,079.98 
1000033608  260,784.73  365,000.00  483.81 

Table 1    The most important risk factors associated with HECMs relate to borrower mortality and mobility (i.e., borrowers’ remaining in their homes until the increasing mortgage balance exceeds the value of the property). Borrowers are more likely to move out of their homes for health reasons as they age, but they become less likely to move out for other reasons. Having more than one borrower tends to extend the life of a HECM because the loan does not become due until the last surviving borrower leaves the property. As of the most recent reporting period, about 43% of the aggregate HMBS balance was associated with HECMs with more than one borrower.   In order to calculate HECM prepayment speeds, we look at the zero balance codes provided in the dataset to exclude loans which have reached a 98% LTV from the opening balance. (As noted earlier, loans must be purchased out of the HMBS once they reach this threshold.) Because interest is deferred in HECM loans, it is added to the opening balance.   We calculate the total prepayments and obtain the single monthly mortality to calculate the CPR. Figure 5, below, shows the one-month CPR by vintage over the past five years.   vintage cpr through time Figure 5    Because borrower mortality and mobility tend to remain stable over time, HECM prepayment speeds exhibit less variability than traditional mortgages do. An important aspect of evaluating CPR includes looking at the outstanding participation balance relative to borrower age. Figure 6 contains a heatmap plotting borrower age against HECM purpose for the most recent reporting period (July 2018).    borrower age against purpose heatmap Figure 6    Because most HECM borrowers are younger than age 80, prepayments are likely to increase as this cohort ages and becomes more likely to move out or pass away.   Figure 7 below shows the five largest HMBS originators by participation as of July 2018. As discussed above, lines of credit (LOCs) are the most popular HECM type with Single Disbursement Lump Sum the next most frequent.      5 largest orinators hecm compositions   Stay tuned for future blog posts in which we will use the Edge platform to glean additional insights from this newly available and very interesting dataset. For information on how to use the Edge platform to conduct your own analyses of this or any other dataset, please contact us.


Houston Strong: Communities Recover from Hurricanes. Do Mortgages?

The 2017 hurricane season devastated individual lives, communities, and entire regions. As one would expect, dramatic increases in mortgage delinquencies accompanied these events. But the subsequent recoveries are a testament both to the resilience of the people living in these areas and to relief mechanisms put into place by the mortgage holders.

Now, nearly a year later, we wanted to see what the credit-risk transfer data (as reported by Fannie Mae CAS and Freddie Mac STACR) could tell us about how these borrowers’ mortgage payments are coming along.

The timing of the hurricanes’ impact on mortgage payments can be approximated by identifying when Current-to-30 days past due (DPD) roll rates began to spike. Barring other major macroeconomic events, we can reasonably assume that most of this increase is directly due to hurricane-related complications for the borrowers.

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

The effect of the hurricanes is clear—Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Houston all experienced delinquency spikes in September. Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands then experienced a second wave of delinquencies in October due to Hurricanes Irma and Maria.

But what has been happening to these loans since entering delinquency? Have they been getting further delinquent and eventually defaulting, or are they curing? We focus our attention on loans in Houston (specifically the Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land Metropolitan Statistical Area) and Puerto Rico because of the large number of observable mortgages in those areas.

First, we look at Houston. Because the 30-DPD peak was in September, we track that bucket of loans. To help us understand the path 30-DPD might reasonably be expected to take, we compared the Houston delinquencies to 30-DPD loans in the 48 states other than Texas and Florida.

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

Of this group of loans in Houston that were 30 DPD in September, we see that while many go on to be 60+ DPD in October, over time this cohort is decreasing in size.

Recovery is slower than the non-hurricane-affected U.S. loans, but persistent. The biggest difference is that a significant number of 30-day delinquencies in the rest of the country loans continue to hover at 30 DPD (rather than curing or progressing to 60 DPD) while the Houston cohort is more evenly split between the growing number loans that cure and the shrinking number of loans progressing to 60+ DPD.

Puerto Rico (which experienced its 30 DPD peak in October) shows a similar trend:

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

To examine loans even more affected by the hurricanes, we can perform the same analysis on loans that reached 60 DPD status.

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

Here, Houston’s peak is in October while Puerto Rico’s is in November.

Houston vs. the non-hurricane-affected U.S.:

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

Puerto Rico vs. the non-hurricane-affected U.S.:

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

In both Houston and Puerto Rico, we see a relatively small 30-DPD cohort across all months and a growing Current cohort. This indicates many people paying their way to Current from 60+ DPD status. Compare this to the rest of the US where more people pay off just enough to become 30 DPD, but not enough to become Current.

The lack of defaults in post-hurricane Houston and Puerto Rico can be explained by several relief mechanisms Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have in place. Chiefly, disaster forbearance gives borrowers some breathing room with regards to payment. The difference is even more striking among loans that were 90 days delinquent, where eventual default is not uncommon in the non-hurricane affected U.S. grouping:

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

And so, both 30-DPD and 60-DPD loans in Houston and Puerto Rico proceed to more serious levels of delinquency at a much lower rate than similarly delinquent loans in the rest of the U.S. To see if this is typical for areas affected by hurricanes of a similar scale, we looked at Fannie Mae loan-level performance data for the New Orleans MSA after Hurricane Katrina in August 2005.

As the following chart illustrates, current-to-30 DPD roll rates peaked in New Orleans in the month following the hurricane:

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

What happened to these loans?

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

Here we see a relatively speedy recovery, with large decreases in the number of 60+ DPD loans and a sharp increase in prepayments. Compare this to non-hurricane affected states over the same period, where the number of 60+ DPD loans held relatively constant, and the number of prepayments grew at a noticeably slower rate than in New Orleans.

Houston Strong - Analysis by Edge

The remarkable number of prepayments in New Orleans was largely due to flood insurance payouts, which effectively prepay delinquent loans. Government assistance lifted many others back to current. As of March, we do not see this behavior in Houston and Puerto Rico, where recovery is moving much more slowly. Flood insurance incidence rates are known to have been low in both areas, a likely suspect for this discrepancy.

While loans are clearly moving out of delinquency in these areas, it is at a much slower rate than the historical precedent of Hurricane Katrina. In the coming months we can expect securitized mortgages in Houston and Puerto Rico to continue to improve, but getting back to normal will likely take longer than what was observed in New Orleans following Katrina. Of course, the impending 2018 hurricane season may complicate this matter.

—————————————————————————————————————-

Note: The analysis in this blog post was developed using RiskSpan’s Edge Platform. The RiskSpan Edge Platform is a module-based data management, modeling, and predictive analytics software platform for loans and fixed-income securities. Click here to learn more.

 


From Main Street to King Abdullah Financial District: Lessons Learned in International Mortgage Finance

In December 2016, I was asked to consult on a start-up real estate refinance company located in the Saudi Arabia. I wasn’t sure I understood what he was saying. As someone who has worked in the U.S. mortgage business since college, the word “refinance” has very strong connotations, but its use seemed wrong in this context. As it turned out in overseas mortgage markets, the phrase real estate refinance refers to “providing funding” or “purchasing mortgage assets.” And that started my quick introduction into the world of international mortgage finance where, “everything is different but in the end it’s all the same.”

By early January 2017 I found myself in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, working as an adviser to a consulting firm contracted to manage the start-up of the new enterprise. Riyadh in January is nice—cool temperatures and low humidity. In the summer it’s another story. Our client was the Ministry of Housing and the Saudi Sovereign Wealth fund. One of the goals of Saudi Arabia’s ambitious Vision 2030 is the creation of its own secondary mortgage company. Saudi Arabia has 18 banks and finance companies originating Islamic mortgages, but the future growth of the economy and population is expected to create demand for mortgages that far exceeds the current financial system’s capacity. The travel and hotel accommodations were delightful. The jet lag and working hours were not.

My foremost motivation for taking the project was to check off “worked overseas” from my career bucket list. Having spent my entire career in the U.S. mortgage business, this had always seemed too distant an opportunity. The project was supposed to last three months, but seventeen months later I’m writing this article in a hotel room overlooking downtown Riyadh. The cultural experience living and working in Saudi Arabia is something I have spent hours discussing with family and friends.

But the goal of this article is not to describe my cultural experiences but to write about the lessons I’ve learned about the U.S. mortgage business sitting 7,000 miles away. Below, I’ve laid out some of my observations.

Underwriting is underwriting

As simple as that. Facts, practices and circumstances may be local, but the principles of sound mortgage underwriting are universal: 1) develop your risk criteria, 2) validate and verify the supporting documentation, 3) underwrite the file and 4) capture performance data to confirm your risk criteria.  Although mortgage lending is only 10 years old in Saudi Arabia, underwriting criteria and methodologies here strongly resemble those in the USA. Loan-to-value ratios, use of appraisals, asset verification, and debt-to-income (DTI) determination—it’s basically the same. All mortgages are fully documented.

But it is different. In Saudi Arabia, where macro-economic issues—i.e., oil prices and lack of economic diversification—dominate the economy, lenders need to find alternatives in underwriting. For example, the use of credit scores takes a second seat to employment stability. To lenders, a borrower’s employer—i.e., government or the military—is more important than a high credit score. Why? Lower oil prices can crush economic growth, leading to higher unemployment with little opportunity for displaced workers to find new jobs. The lack of a diversified economy makes lenders wary of lending to employees of private-sector companies, hence their focus on lending to government employees. This impact leads to whole segments of potential borrowers being left out of the mortgage market.

The cold reality in emerging economic countries like Saudi Arabia is that only the best borrowers can get loans. Even then, lenders may require a “salary assignment,” in which a borrower’s employer pays the lender directly. The lesson is that the primary credit risk strategy in Saudi Arabia is to avoid credit losses by all means—the best way to manage credit risk is to avoid it.

Finance is finance

Finance is the same everywhere and concepts of cash flow and return analysis are universal, whether the transaction is Islamic or conventional. There’s lots of confusion about what Islamic finance is and how it works.  Many people misunderstand shariah law and its rules on paying interest. Not all banks in Saudi Arabia are Islamic, and although many are, while paying interest on debt is non-sharia, leases and equity returns are sharia compliant. The key to Islamic finance is selecting appropriate finance products that comply with shariah but also meet the needs of lenders.

In Saudi Arabia, most lenders originate Islamic mortgages called Ijarah.  With an Ijarah mortgage the borrower selects a property to purchase and then goes to the lender. At closing the lender accepts a down payment from the borrower and the lender purchases the property directly from the seller. The lender then executes an agreement to lease the property to the borrower for the life of the mortgage.  This looks a lot like a long-term lease. Instead of paying an interest rate, the borrower pays an APR on a stated equity return or “profit rate” to the lender on the lease arrangement.

Similarly, Islamic warehouse lending on mortgage collateral resembles a traditional repo transaction—an agreed upon sale price and repurchase price and a bunch of commodity trades linked to the transaction.  In Islamic finance, the art relies on a sound understanding of the cash flows, the collateral limitations, the needs of all parties, and Islamic law. Over the past decade, the needs of the lenders, investors and intermediaries has evolved into set of standardized transactions that meet the financing needs of the market.

People are people

People are the same everywhere—good, bad and otherwise—and it’s no different overseas. And there is a lot of great talent out there. The people I have worked with are talented, motivated and educated. I have had the opportunity to work with Saudis and people from at least 15 other countries. Fortunately for me, English is the operating business language in Saudi Arabia and no one is any wiser to whether my explanations of the U.S. mortgage market are accurate or not. The international consulting and accounting firms have done a tremendous job creating strong business models to identify, hire, train and manage employees, cultivating a rich talent pool of consultants and future employees.  A rich country like Saudi Arabia is a magnet for expats—it has both the money and vision to afford talent. In addition, Saudi Arabia’s rapid population growth and strong education system has added to a homegrown pool of talented employees.

Standardization is a benefit worth fighting for

One of the primary goals of any international refinance or secondary market company is standardization. The benefits of standardization extend to all market participants—borrowers, lenders and investors. Secondary market companies thrive where transactions are cheaper, faster and better, making it an easy choice for government policymakers to support. For consumers, rates are lower, the choices of lenders and products are better, and the origination process is more transparent. For investors, the standardization of structures, cash flows and obligations improves liquidity, increases the number of active market participants and ultimately lowers the transactional bid/ask spreads and yields.

However, the benefits of standardization are less clear for the primary customer they are meant to help—the lenders. While standardization can lower operating expenses or improve business processes, it does little to increase the comparative advantages of each lender.

Saudi lenders are focused on customer service and product design, leaving price aside. This focus has led lenders to design mortgage products with unique interest rate adjustment periods, payment options and one-of-a-kind mortgage notes and customized purchase and sale agreements.[1] This degree of customization can be a recipe for disaster, leading to endless negotiations, misunderstandings of rate reset mechanisms, extended deal timelines, and differences of opinion among shariah advisers. When negotiations are culturally a zero-sum game, trying to persuade lenders of the rationale for advancing monthly payments by the 10th of each month is exhausting.

Saudi lenders see the long-term benefits of increased volume, selling credit exposure and servicing income. But they haven’t figured out that strong secondary markets lead to the development of tertiary markets like forward trading in MBS, trading of Mortgage Servicing Rights (MSRs) or better terms for warehouse lending.

Mortgages are sold, not purchased

It’s a universal tenet throughout the world: buying real estate and financing it with a mortgage is a complex transaction. It requires experienced and well-trained loan officers to aid and walk the consumers through the process.  A loan officer’s skill at persuading a potential customer to submit a loan application is every bit as important as his knowledge of mortgages. It’s no different in Saudi Arabia. While building relationships with realtors is important, the Saudi market is more of a construction-to-permanent market than a resale market. Individuals builders are simply too small to be able to channel consumers to lenders.

What to do? The Saudi mortgage origination market has quickly evolved to using alternatives like social media to capture consumer traffic.  Saudi citizens are some of the most active users of social media in world.[2] (How active? From my experience, 9 out of 10 drivers on the road are reading their smart phones instead on looking at the road—it’s downright scary.) Lenders have developed sophisticated media campaigns using Twitter, You Tube and other platforms to drive traffic to their call centers where loan officers can sell mortgages to potential borrowers.

Whatever the language, closing lines are the same everywhere.

Regulation – A necessary evil

Saudi Arabia’s is a highly regulated financial market. Its primary financial regulator is the Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority, better known as SAMA. Regulation and oversight is centrally controlled and has been in place for almost 70 years. SAMA has placed a premium on well-capitalized financial institutions and closely monitors transactions and the liquidity of its institutions. The approval process is detailed and time consuming, but it has resulted in well-capitalized institutions. The minimum capital of the country’s five non-bank mortgage lenders exceeds $100MM USD.

A secondary role of SAMA has been to maintain stability within the financial markets—protecting consumers against bad actors and minimizing the market’s systematic risks. Financial literacy among Saudi citizens is low and comprehensive consumer protections akin to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) in the U.S. don’t exist here. SAMA fills this role, resulting in an ad hoc mix of consumer protections with mixed enforcement actions. Sometimes the cost of the protection is greater than evil it’s ostensibly protecting against.

As examples, SAMA regulates the maximum LTVs for the mortgage market and limits the consumer’s out-of-pocket cash fees to $1,250 USD. Managing LTV limits for the market goes a long way toward preventing over-lending when the markets are speculative. This was extremely beneficial in cooling down a hot Saudi real estate market in 2013.

Capping a borrower’s out-of-pocket expenses makes sense to limit unscrupulous market players from hustling borrowers. But the downside is the inability of lenders to monetize their transactions—i.e., to get cash from borrowers, sell mortgages at premium prices or sell servicing rights. This results in higher mortgage rates as lenders push up their mortgage coupons to generate cash to reimburse them for the higher costs associated with originating the mortgage. It is also a factor in the lenders’ use of prepayment penalties.

External constraints affect the design of local mortgage products

Ultimately, mortgage financing products available to consumers in any country are a function of the maturity level and the previous legacy development of its financial and capital markets. In Saudi Arabia, where large banks dominate, the deposit funding strategies determine mortgage product design.  Capital markets are relatively new in the Kingdom. Only in the past several years has the Saudi government issued enough Sukuks to fill the Saudi Arabian yield curve out to ten years. While the government has plenty of buyers for its debt, the primary mortgage lenders do not. The concept of amortizing debt products is anathema to the market’s debt investors. Without access to longer-term debt buyers, the mortgage market products are primarily linked to 1-year SAIBOR (the Saudi version of LIBOR). This inability to secure long-term funding impacts amortization periods the lenders can offer, with most mortgages limited to a maximum amortization period of 20 years. The high mortgage rates, short-fixed payment tenors and short amortization periods all contribute to affordability issues for the average Saudi citizen.

Affordable Housing is an issue everywhere

Over the past 50 years Saudi Arabia’s vast oil wealth has enabled it to become an educated, middle-class society. The trillions of dollars in oil revenues have enabled the country to transform from a nomadic culture to a modern economy with growth centered in its primary cities. But its population growth rate and urban migration has created a mismatch of affordable housing in the growth centers of the country.  The lack of affordable urban housing, outdated government housing policies and restrictive mortgage lending policies has stifled both the demand and supply of affordable housing units.

While well-functioning capital markets can help to lower mortgage rates and improve credit terms, it is only a small part of the solution for helping people afford and remain in housing. In this regard, Saudi Arabia looks a lot like the United States. With entities like the Real Estate Development Fund (REDF), Saudia Arabia is trying to manage the challenges of creating housing programs that solve housing issues for all, as opposed to subsidy programs that only help a small minority of people, operating with the high cost of program administration and with nominal benefits to its participants.

Concluding Thoughts

The past year and half have been both personally and professionally rewarding. The opportunity to live and work abroad and to become immersed in another culture has been gratifying. Professionally, it’s been eye-opening to see the limits of my previous experiences and need to recalibrate my core assumptions and thinking.

I maintain that the United States absolutely has the best mortgage finance system in the world. The ability of our secondary markets to provide consumers with low mortgage rates and a 30-yr fixed rate mortgage has no match in the world. The modern U.S. mortgage market, with its century of history and supportive policy decisions, has the luxury of scale, government guarantees and depth of investor classes.

Saudi Arabia’s own mortgage solutions are mostly a result of necessity. For the country, it has been more important to build a stable and well-capitalized banking system—and then to provide affordable mortgage products and terms. Think of it in terms of airline safely instructions—secure your own oxygen mask first, and then take care of your children.

Housing finance systems aren’t like building smart phone networks. You can’t just import the technology and billing systems and flip a switch. It’s a long-cycle development that requires the legal systems, regulatory framework and entities and a mature finance industry before you can start contemplating and building a secondary market.

As I reflect on my experiences in Saudi Arabia, I would describe the role I have played as that of an intermediary—applying proven “best in class” secondary market and risk management approaches I learned at home to Saudi Arabia. And then trying to understand their limits and coming up with Plan B. And sometimes Plan C…


[1] Competition has not prompted an expansion of the credit box, as lenders are generally risk averse and their regulators are hyper diligent on credit standards.

[2] https://www.go-gulf.com/blog/social-media-saudi-arabia/


The Surging Reverse Mortgage Market

Momentum continues to build around reverse mortgages and related products. Persistent growth in both home prices and the senior population has stoked renewed interest and discussion about the most appropriate uses of accumulated home equity in financial planning strategies. A common and superficial way to think of reverse mortgages is as a “last-resort” means of covering expenses when more conventional planning tools prove insufficient. But experts increasingly are not thinking of reverse mortgages in this way. Last week, the American College of Financial Services and the Bipartisan Policy Center hosted the 2018 Housing Wealth in Retirement Symposium.  Speakers represented policy research think tanks, institutional asset managers, large banks, and AARP.  Notwithstanding the diversity of viewpoints, virtually every speaker reiterated a position that financial planners have posited for years: financial products that leverage home equity should, in many cases, be integrated into comprehensive retirement planning strategies, rather than being reserved as a product of last resort.

Senior Home Equity Continues Trending Upward

The National Reverse Mortgage Lenders Association (NRMLA) and RiskSpan have published the Reverse Mortgage Market Index (RMMI) since the beginning of 2000. The RMMI provides a trending measure of home equity of U.S. homeowners age 62 and older. The RMMI defines senior home equity as the difference between the aggregate value of homes owned and occupied by seniors and the aggregate mortgage balance secured by those homes. This measure enables the RMMI to help gauge the potential market size of those who may be qualified for a reverse mortgage product. The chart below illustrates the steady increase in this index since the end of the 2008 recession. It reached its latest all-time high in the most recent quarter (Q4 2017). Increasing house prices drive this trend, mitigated to some extent by a corresponding modest increase in mortgage debt held by seniors. The most recent RMMI report is published on NRMLA’s website. As summarized below by the Urban Institute, home equity can be extracted through many mechanisms, primarily Federal Housing Administration (FHA)–insured Home Equity Conversion Mortgages (HECMs), closed-end home equity loans, home equity lines of credit (HELOCs), and cash-out refinancing.

Share of Homeowners Who Extracted Home Equity by Strategy

The Urban Institute research goes on to point out that although few seniors have extracted home equity to date, the market is potentially very large (as reflected by the RMMI index) and more extraction is likely in the years ahead as the senior population both grows and ages. The data in the following chart confirm what one might reasonably expect—that younger seniors are more likely to have existing mortgages than older seniors.

 

Reverse Mortgage as Retirement Planning Tool

Looking at senior home equity in the context of overall net worth lends support to financial planners’ view of products like reverse mortgages as more than something on which to fall back as a last resort. The first three rows of data in the table below contains the median net worth by age cohort in 2013 and 2016, respectively, from Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances. The bottom row, highlighted in yellow, is the estimated average senior home equity (total senior home equity as computed by the RMMI divided by senior population) for the same years. We acknowledge the imprecision inherent in this comparison due to the statistical method used (median vs. average) and certain data limitations on RMMI (addressed below). Additionally, the net worth figures may include non-homeowners. Nonetheless, home equity is an unignorably important component of senior net worth.

Following the release of the Federal Reserve’s 2016 Survey of Consumer Finances https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/scfindex.htm, the Urban Institute published a summary research paper “What the 2016 Survey of Consumer Finances Tells Us about Senior Homeowners” https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/94526/what-the-2016-survey-of-consumer-finances-tells-us-about-senior-homeowners.pdf in November 2017.  The paper notes that “Worries about retirement security are rooted in several factors, such as Social Security changes that shrink the share of preretirement earnings replaced by the program (Munnell and Sundén 2005), rising medical and long-term care costs (Johnson and Mommaerts 2009, 2010), student loan burdens, and the shift from employer-sponsored defined-benefit pension plans that guarantee lifetime income to 401(k)-type defined-contribution plans whose account balances depend on employee contributions and uncertain investment returns (Munnell 2014; Munnell and Sundén 2005). In addition, increased life expectancies require retirement savings to last longer.”

The financial position of seniors is evolving.  Forty-one percent of homeowners age 65 and older now have a mortgage on their primary residence, compared with just 21 percent in 1989, and the median outstanding debt has risen from $16,793 to $72,000, according to the Urban Institute. As more households enter retirement with more debt, a growing number will likely tap into their home as a source of income. Hurdles and challenges remain, however, and education will play an important role in fostering responsible use of reverse mortgage products.

Note on the Limitations of RMMI

To calculate the RMMI, an econometric tool is developed to estimate senior housing value, senior mortgage level, and senior equity using data gathered from various public resources such as American Community Survey (ACS), Federal Reserve Flow of Funds (Z.1), and FHFA housing price indexes (HPI). The RMMI is simply the senior equity level at time of measure relative to that of the base quarter in 2000.[1]  The main limitation of RMMI is non-consecutive data, such as census population. We use a smoothing approach to estimate data in between the observable periods and continue to look for ways to improve our methodology and find more robust data to improve the precision of the results. Until then, the RMMI and its relative metrics (values, mortgages, home equities) are best analyzed at a trending macro level, rather than at more granular levels, such as MSA.


[1] There was a change in RMMI methodology in Q3 2015 mainly to calibrate senior homeowner population and senior housing values observed in 2013 American Community Survey (ACS).


Fed MBS Runoff Portends More Negative Vega for the Broader Market

With much anticipation and fanfare, the Federal Reserve is finally on track to reduce its MBS holdings. Guidance from the September FOMC meeting reveals that the Fed will allow its MBS holdings to “run off,” reducing its position via prepayments as opposed to selling it off. What does this Fed MBS Runoff mean for the market? In the long-term, it means a large increase in net supply of Agency MBS and with it an increase in overall implied and realized volatility.

MBS: The Largest Net Source of Options in the Fixed-Income Market

We start this analysis with some basic background on the U.S. MBS market. U.S. homeowners, by in large, finance home purchases using fixed-rate 30-year mortgages. These fixed-rate mortgages amortize over time, allowing the homeowner to pay principal and interest in even, monthly payments. A homeowner has the option to pay off this mortgage early for any reason, which they tend to do when either the homeowner moves, often referred to as turnover, or when prevailing mortgage rates drop significantly below the homeowner’s current mortgage rate, referred to as refinancing or “refis.” As a rough rule-of-thumb, turnover has varied between 6% and 10% per annum as economic conditions vary, whereas refis can drive prepayments to 40% per annum under current lending conditions.[1] Rate refis account for most of a mortgage’s cash flow volatility. If the homeowner is long the option to refinance, the MBS holder is short that same option. Fixed-rate MBS shorten due to prepayments as rates drop, and extend as rates rise, putting the MBS holder into a short convexity (gamma) and short vega position. Some MBS holders hedge this risk explicitly, buying short- and longer-dated options to cover their short gamma/short vega risk. Others hedge dynamically, including money managers and long-only funds that tend to target a duration bogey. One way or another, the short-volatility risk from MBS is transmitted into the larger fixed-income market. Hence, the rates market is net short vol risk. While not all investors hedge their short-volatility position, the aggregate market tends to hedge a similar amount of the short-options position over time. Until, of course, the Fed, the largest buyer of MBS, entered the market. From the start of Quantitative Easing, the Fed purchased progressively more of the MBS market, until by the end of 2014 the Fed just under 30% of the agency MBS market. Over the course of five years, the effective size of the MBS market ex-Fed shrunk by more than a quarter. Since the Fed doesn’t hedge its position, either explicitly through options or implicitly through delta-hedging, the size of the market’s net-short volatility position dropped by a similar fraction.[2]

The Fed’s Balance Sheet

As of early October 2017, the Federal Reserve owned $1.77 trillion agency MBS, or just under 30% of the outstanding agency MBS market. The Fed publishes its holdings weekly which can be found on the New York Fed’s web site here. In the chart below, we summarize the Fed’s 30yr MBS holdings, which make up roughly 90% of the Fed’s MBS holdings. [3]

Fed Holdings - 30yr MBS

Runoff from the Fed

Following its September meeting, the Fed announced they will reduce their balance sheet by not reinvesting run-off from their treasury and MBS portfolio. If the Fed sticks to its plan, MBS monthly runoff from MBS will reach $20B by 2018 Q1. Assuming no growth in the aggregate mortgage market, runoff from these MBS will be replaced with the same size of new, at-the-money MBS passthroughs. Since the Fed is not reinvesting paydowns, these new passthroughs will re-enter the non-Fed-held MBS market, which does hedge volatility by either buying options or delta-hedging. Given the expected runoff rate of the Fed’s portfolio, we can now estimate the vega exposure of new mortgages entering the wider (non-Fed-held) market. When fully implemented, we estimate that $20B in new MBS represents roughly $34 million in vega hitting the market each month. To put that in perspective, that is roughly equivalent to $23 billion notional 3yr->5yr ATM swaption straddles hitting the market each and every month.

Conclusion

While the Fed isn’t selling its MBS holdings, portfolio runoff will have a significant impact on rate volatility. Runoff implies significant net issuance ex-Fed. It’s reasonable to expect increased demand for options hedging, as well as increased delta-hedging, which should drive both implied and realized vol higher over time. This change will manifest itself slowly as monthly prepayments shrinks the Fed’s position. But the reintroduction of negative vega into the wider market represents a change in paradigm which may lead to a more volatile rates market over time.


[1] In the early 2000s, prepayments hit their all-time highs with the aggregate market prepaying in excess of 60% per annum. [2] This is not entirely accurate. The short-vol position in a mortgage passthrough is also a function of its note rate (GWAC) with respect to the prevailing market rate, and the mortgage market has a distribution of note rates. But the statement is broadly true. [3] The remaining Fed holdings are primarily 15yr MBS pass-throughs.


The Non-Agency MBS Market: Re-Assessing Securitization Market Conditions

Since the financial crisis began in 2007, the “Non-Agency” MBS market, i.e., securities neither issued nor guaranteed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or Ginnie Mae, has been sporadic and has not rebounded from pre-crisis levels. In recent months, however, activity by large financial institutions, such as AIG and Wells Fargo, has indicated a return to the issuance of Non-Agency MBS. What is contributing to the current state of the securitization market for high-quality mortgage loans? Does the recent, limited-scale return to issuance by these institutions signal an increase in private securitization activity in this sector of the securitization market? If so, what is sparking this renewed interest?

 

The MBS Securitization Market

Three entities – Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac – have been the dominant engine behind mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issuance since 2007. These entities, two of which remain in federal government conservatorship and the third a federal government corporation, have maintained the flow of capital from investors into guaranteed MBS and ensured that mortgage originators have adequate funds to originate certain types of single-family mortgage loans.

Virtually all mortgage loans backed by federal government insurance or guaranty programs, such as those offered by the Federal Housing Administration and the Department of Veterans Affairs, are issued in Ginnie Mae pools. Mortgage loans that are not eligible for these programs are referred to as “Conventional” mortgage loans. In the current market environment, most Conventional mortgage loans are sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (i.e. “Conforming” loans) and are securitized in Agency-guaranteed pass-through securities.

 

The Non-Agency MBS Market

Not all Conventional mortgage loans are eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, however, due to collateral restrictions (i.e., their loan balances are too high or they do not meet certain underwriting requirements). These are referred to as “Non-Conforming” loans and, for most of the past decade, have been held in portfolio at large financial institutions, rather than placed in private, Non-Agency MBS. The Non-Agency MBS market is further divided into sectors for “Qualified Mortgage” (QM) loans, non-QM loans, re-performing loans and nonperforming loans. This post deals with the securitization of QM loans through Non-Agency MBS programs.

Since the crisis, Non-Agency MBS issuance has been the exclusive province of JP Morgan and Redwood Trust, both of which continue to issue a relatively small number of deals each year. The recent entry of AIG into the Non-Agency MBS market and, combined with Wells Fargo’s announcement that it intends to begin issuing as well, makes this a good time to discuss reasons why these institutions with other funding sources available to them are now moving back to this securitization market sector.

 

Considerations for Issuing QM Loans

Three potential considerations may lead financial institutions to investigate issuing QM Loans through Non-Agency MBS transactions:

  • “All-In” Economics
  • Portfolio Concentration or Limitations
  • Regulatory Pressures

Investigate “All-In” Economics

Over the long-term, mortgage originators gravitate to funding sources that provide the lowest cost to borrowers and profitability for their firms.  To improve the “all-in” economics of a Non-Agency MBS transaction, investment banks work closely with issuers to broaden the investor base for each level of the securitization capital structure.  Partly due to the success of the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Credit Risk Transfer transactions, there appears to be significant interest in higher-yielding mortgage-related securities at the lower-rated (i.e. higher risk) end of the securitization capital structure. This need for higher yielding assets has also increased demand for lower-rated securities in the Non-Agency MBS sector.

However, demand from investors at the higher-rated end of the securitization capital structure (i.e. ‘AAA’ and ‘AA’ securities) has not resulted in “all-in” economics for a Non-Agency MBS transaction that surpass the economics of balance sheet financing provided by portfolios funded with low deposit rates or low debt costs. If deposit rates and debt costs remain at historically low levels, the portfolio funding alternative will remain attractive. Notwithstanding the low interest rate environment, some institutions may develop operational capabilities for Non-Agency MBS programs as a risk mitigation process for future periods where balance sheet financing alternatives may not be as beneficial.

 

Portfolio Concentration or Limitations

Due to the lack of robust investor demand and unfavorable economics in Non-Agency MBS, many banks have increased their portfolio exposure to both fixed-rate and intermediate-adjustable-rate QM loans. The ability to hold these mortgage loans in portfolio has provided attractive pricing to a key customer demographic and earned an attractive net interest rate margin during the historical low-rate environment. While bank portfolios have provided an attractive funding source for Non-Agency QM loans, some financial institutions may attempt to develop diversified funding sources in response to regulatory pressure or self-imposed portfolio concentration limits. Selling existing mortgage portfolio assets into the Non-Agency MBS securitization market is one way in which financial institutions might choose to reduce concentrated mortgage risk exposure.

 

Regulatory Pressure

Some financial institutions may be under pressure from their regulators to demonstrate their ability to sell assets out of their mortgage portfolio as a contingency plan. The Non-Agency MBS market is one way of complying with these sorts of regulatory requests. Developing a contingency ability to tap Non-Agency MBS markets develops operational capabilities under less critical circumstances, while assessing the time needed by the institution to liquidate such assets through securitization. This early establishment of securitization functionalities is a prudent activity for those institutions who foresee the possibility of securitization as a future funding option.

While the Non-Agency MBS market has been dormant for most of the past decade, some financial institutions that have relied upon portfolio funding now appear to be testing the current viability of the Non-Agency MBS market. Other mortgage originators would be wise to take notice of these events, monitor activity in these markets, and assess the viability of this alternative funding source for their on-Conforming QM Loans. With the continued issuance by JP Morgan and Redwood Trust and new entrants such as AIG and Wells Fargo, -Non-Agency MBS market activity should be monitored by other mortgage originators to determine whether securitization has the potential to provide an alternative funding source for future lending activity.

In our next article on the Non-Agency MBS market, we will review the changes in due diligence practices, loan-level data disclosures, the representation and warranty framework, and the ratings process made by securitization market participants and the impact of these changes on the Non-Agency MBS market segment.


The Real Reason Low Down Payment VA loans Don’t Default Like Comparable FHA Loans

On this Veterans Day, I was reminded of the Urban Institute’s 2014 article on VA loan performance and its explanation of why VA loans outperform FHA loans.1 The article illustrated how VA loans outperformed comparable FHA loans despite controlling for key variables like FICO, income, and DTI. The article further explained the structural differences and similarities between the veterans program and FHA loans—similarities that include owner occupancy, loan size, and low down payments.

The analysis was well thought out and clearly showed how VA loans outperformed FHA. The article took great care to understand how FICOs, DTI, and income levels could impact default performance. The article further demonstrated VA outperformance wasn’t a recent or short-lived trend.

Its concluding rationale for superior performance was based on:

  1. VA’s residual income test
  2. VA’s loss mitigation efforts
  3. Lender’s “skin in the game”
  4. Lender concentration
  5. Military culture

Two of these reasons assume VA’s internal policies made the difference. Two of the reasons assume lenders’ ability to self-regulate credit policy or capital had an influence. The final reason centered on veterans as a social group with differing values that contributed to the difference.

As someone who has spent his mortgage career between modeling credit, counterparty risks and managing credit underwriters, the lack of good analytical data or anecdotal evidence makes it hard to see how these reasons can account for VA’s strong relative default performance versus FHA. While I understand their rationale, I don’t see how it makes for a compelling explanation.

VA Internal Policies

The residual income test is a tertiary measure used by lenders to qualify borrowers. It is used after applying the traditional MTI (mortgage payment to income) and DTI (total debt to income) ratios. The test mandates that the borrowing veteran have a minimum net income after paying all mortgage and debt payments. But as a third-level underwriting test, it is hard to see how it could be the source of so much of default performance improvement.

The same goes for VA’s loss mitigation outreach efforts. It sounds good in the press, but it is just a secondary loss mitigation effort used in conjunction with the servicer’s own loss mitigation efforts. Perhaps it is responsible for some of the incremental improvement, but it’s hard to believe it accounts for much more.

Lenders’ Ability to Self-Regulate

“Skin in the Game” attempts to explain how lenders manage their retained credit risk when the VA insurance payment is insufficient to cover all loan losses.2 The “Skin in the Game” theory holds when lenders have exposure to losses they will adjust their lending policies to reduce their risk. This translates into tighter credit policies, like floors on credit scores or ceilings on DTIs. Having worked for companies with strong credit cultures that nearly failed in the recent financial crisis, I find it hard to believe privately held mortgage bankers can manage this risk. Quite the opposite, my experience tells me: 1) lenders always underestimate their residual credit risks, and 2) pressure for volume, market share, and profits quickly overwhelm any attempts to maintain credit discipline.

The notion that lender concentration in the VA originations market somehow means that those lenders have more capital or the ability to earn more money also makes little sense. Historically, the largest source of origination revenue is the capitalized value of the MSRs created when the loan is securitized. Over the past several years Ginnie Mae MSR prices have collapsed. This severely limits the profit margins from VA loans. Trust me, the top lenders are not making it up on volume.

Effect of Military Culture on VA Loans

So, what’s left? Military culture. This I believe. And not just because it is the only reason left. As the son of a retired Army colonel and the brother of both a retired Navy captain and a retired Marine Corps lieutenant colonel, I think I understand what the military culture is.

My view of military culture isn’t that veterans are more disciplined or responsible than the rest of the American public. My view of military culture is that institutional, structural, and societal differences make the military personnel workforce different than that of the general public. How?

Job Security

  • Active duty military personnel are not subject to mass layoffs or reductions in force typical in the business world.
  • Poor performing military personnel are typically eased out of the military and not fired.  This process of “getting passed over” spans several years and not weeks or months.
  • Most active duty military personnel have the flexibility to determine their exit strategy/retirement date, so they can defer when economic times are bad.

Retirement

  • Military personnel can retire with 50% pay of their base pay after 20 years of service.
  • This pension is received immediately upon retirement and is indexed to inflation.

Job Skills

  • A high percentage of retired military personnel re-enter the workforce and work for governmental agencies.
  • Military personnel typically leave active duty with more marketable skills than their similarly educated peers.
  • Active duty, retired, and former military personnel have jobs/careers/professions that are in higher demand than the rest of the American population.

Military Pay

  • Active and retired military pay is transparent, public, and socialized. The only variables are rank and years in service. The pay schedule provides for automatic pay increases based on the number of years in service and rank. Every two years you will get a pay increase. If you get promoted, you will get a pay raise. You know how much your boss makes. Female service-members make the same pay as their male counterparts.
  • Military pay is indexed to inflation.
  • In addition to their base pay, all military personnel are given a tax-free monthly housing allowance which is adjusted regionally.

Medical

  • All military families, active duty and retired, receive full medical care.
  • This health insurance has nearly no deductible or out-of-pocket expenses.
  • This means veterans don’t default due to catastrophic medical emergencies or have their credit capacity impacted by unpaid medical bills. 

It is for these reasons that I believe VA borrowers default less frequently than FHA borrowers. The U.S. military is not a conscripted force, but rather an all-volunteer force. The structural programs offered by the U.S. Government provide the incentives necessary for people to remain in the military.

The Federal Government has designed a military force with low turnover and backed by an institutionalized social safety net to help recruit, retain, and reward its personnel.  Lower default rates associated with the VA loan program are just the secondary benefits of a nation trying to keep its citizens safe.

So, on this Veterans Day, remember to thank a veteran for his service. But also, remember the efforts of the Federal Government to ease the difficulties of those protecting our nation.


[1] Housing Finance Policy Center Commentary, “VA Loans Outperform FHA Loans. Why. And What Can We Learn?”, Laura Goodman, Ellen Seidman, Jun Zhu.  Urban Institute – July 16, 201

[2] VA insurance is a first loss guaranty like MI insurance.  If the loss is greater than the insurance payment the mortgage servicer is responsible for the additional loss


Single Family Rental Securitization Market

The Single Family Rental Market

The single family rental market has existed for decades as a thriving part of the U.S. housing market.  Investment in single family homes for rental purposes has provided many opportunities for the American “mom and pop” investors to build and maintain wealth, prepare for retirement, and hold residual cash flow producing assets.   According to the National Rental Home Council (NRHC) (“Single-Family Rental Primer”; Green Street Advisors, June 6, 2016) as of year-end 2015, the single-family rental market comprised approximately 13% (16 million detached single-family rentals) of all occupied housing and roughly 37% of the entire United States rental market.

Single-Family Rental Securitization Structure

Introduce the credit crisis of 2008.  Limited credit for non-prime borrowers in combination with record setting delinquency and foreclosure rates prompted a significant reduction of housing prices. According to the S&P CoreLogic Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price NSA Index, since the index’s launch in May 18, 2006 (initial index value = 184.38), national house prices had dropped 25% (index value = 138.5) by April 2012.

The market dynamic combination of low prices and post-crises rental demand along with highly restrictive mortgage credit qualifications alerted particular investors to an opportunity.  Specific private institutional investors, mostly private equity firms, began acquiring large quantities of distressed single family homes. According to the working paper entitled “The Emerging Economic Geography of Single-Family Rental Securitization” by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (Fields, Kohli, Schafran; January 2016) the entrance of these “large institutional investors into their new role as ‘corporate landlords’ [represented] a paradigm shift for the single-family rental market.”

Not only did they rehabilitate the homes and rent them out to non-prime borrowers, they then in turn introduced these assets into the capital markets by pledging the collateral and rental receipts into publicly issued REIT’s as well as issuing single-family rental securitizations (SFR).  The issuance of single family rental securitizations was a new concept utilizing an old vehicle, the issuance of a bankruptcy remote special purpose vehicle for the purpose of issuing debt via pledged collateral assets.

In this case, the collateral is generally a loan secured by a first priority mortgage (that was placed in an LP or LLC) backed by the pledging or sale of the underlying single family homes operated as rental properties (also normally placed in a previous LP or LLC).  Not only did this provide a strong exit strategy for investors because it allowed them to obtain immediate capital, but they were also able to increase their leveraged return on equity.

When Did Single-Family Rental Securitization Begin?

The first securitization transaction was issued in November 2013 by Invitation Homes (IH, 2013-1), a subsidiary of the Blackstone Group BX. As of July 2016, 32 single-borrower (26) and multi-borrower (six) SFR transactions have been issued. The table below provides a list of all SFR single and multi- borrower securitization transactions rated as of July 2016.123

Table: SFR Securitization Transactions Rated as of July 2016

Interestingly, the current inventory owned as well as securitized is only approximately 1 to 2% of the overall market.  Also of particular interest is the recent consolidation of institutions active in this market and the introduction of new participants.  American Homes 4 Rent (AM4R) acquired Beazer Rental Homes in July 2014 and Colony American Homes (Colony) merged with Starwood Waypoint Residential Trust (SWAY) in January 2016.  Subsequent to the Colony and SWAY merger, this newly formed company issued its own SFR securitization in June 2016 of approximately 3,600 properties with a loan balance of $536 million (CSH, 2016-1).  Moreover introducing themselves into the SFR securitization market was Home Partners of America (formerly Hyperion Homes, Inc.), which issued its first single-family rental securitization earlier this year (approximately $654mm, property count of 2,232).

Single-Family Rental Securitization Market Outlook

The question remains, is the SFR securitization market here to stay? On the one hand, issuance still appears to be strong; however, SFRs could be an efficient market’s response to the market dislocation of 2008, the effects of which may now appear to be fading away.  At a minimum this type of securitization demonstrates the effectiveness of the capital markets in moving quickly to fill the gaps left by the bursting of the housing bubble.


[1] Source: Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc. (KBRA)

[2] Source: www.businesswire.com

[3] Source: Yahoo Finance


Get Started
Log in

Linkedin   

risktech2024