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Articles Tagged with: Mortgage and Structured Finance Markets

Models & Markets Update: April 2026 

Register here for next month’s call: Thursday, May 21st, 2026, 1 p.m. ET. 

Key Takeaways 

  • Prepayment models continue to perform well, with March speeds driven by a February rate rally and day count effects 
  • A new Non-QM Credit Model (CM 7.1) is on track for release near end of Q2 2026, with a dedicated webinar planned for end of May or early June 
  • Housing turnover analysis reveals rate sensitivity at positive refinancing incentive levels — a finding that will inform the next prepayment model 
  • Mortgage rates hit a six-month high in March before pulling back; rates are expected to remain above 6% through 2026 and 2027 
  • No Federal Reserve rate cuts are expected in 2026; the consumer remains under pressure from elevated rates and rising credit card balances 

You can read the recap below or click here for the entire recording. 

Prepayment Model Back-Testing: April Factor Data Update 

The prepayment model continues to track realized speeds closely across Agency collateral. Results are available on the Edge platform under the Vertex module. 

Fannie/Freddie — Discount Coupons (WAC 5.5 and Below) 

Discount coupons showed a modest uptick in March speeds, driven primarily by two factors: 

  • A day count effect: March had three more collection days than February 
  • Seasonal turnover patterns typical of the spring housing market 

Figure 1: FN/FH Discount Coupon Back-Testing — Model CPR vs. Observed CPR 

Fannie/Freddie — Premium Coupons (WAC 6.0 and Higher) 

Premium coupons saw a sharper increase in prepayment speeds in March, driven primarily by the rates rally in February. With rates subsequently moving higher in March, May factor data is expected to show a decline in speeds — a clear convex response consistent with model expectations. 

Figure 2: FN/FH Premium Coupon Back-Testing — Model CPR vs. Observed CPR 

GNMA — FHA and VA Segmentation 

GNMA performance showed a similar pattern to Fannie/Freddie across discount and premium coupons. A notable enhancement this month: the team has introduced the ability to split GNMA back-testing results by FHA vs. VA segments on the Vertex report, providing additional analytical granularity. 

Two segment-level observations: 

  • FHA: FHA: The model has shown a slight drift in prepayment speeds over the past year. This is primarily attributed to the FHA trial modification policy change in 2025, under which servicers are no longer required to buy out delinquent loans — a policy shift that has meaningfully reduced prepayment speeds relative to historical levels. 
  • VA: VA: A discrepancy between modeled and actual speeds reflects the default VA-to-PMMS spread assumption being too tight. Users can adjust the VA spread to current market levels within the platform to bring results into closer alignment with observed speeds. 

Figure 3: FHA Segment Back-Testing 

Figure 4: VA Segment Back-Testing 

New Non-QM Credit Model: CM 7.1 

Guanlin Chen from the Quantitative Modeling Group presented an overview of the upcoming Non-QM Credit Model, version 7.1, expected to be available to all users near end of Q2 2026. 

Model Structure 

CM 7.1 follows the same three-component framework as RiskSpan’s agency credit model: 

  • 1. Transition Model — generates a time-varying transition matrix estimating transition probabilities across delinquency states and time periods 
  • 2. Liquidation Timeline Model — applied once a loan enters default 
  • 3. Severity Model — estimates final losses on the defaulted balance 

A key design decision: the model is built with separate sub-models for each documentation type, consistent with the segmentation used in the Non-QM prepayment model: Bank Statement, DSCR, Full Doc, and Other. This segmentation reflects the meaningfully different performance characteristics across these loan types and allows for more accurate, documentation-specific projections. 

Transition Matrix Design 

The transition matrix tracks loans across delinquency states — current (0), one-month delinquent (1), two-month delinquent (2), foreclosure (F), and REO (R) — with additional granularity for delinquency history.

Back-Testing Results 

Initial back-testing of the 30-day delinquency transition demonstrates that the model captures the overall trend in Non-QM credit performance well across all four documentation types. The COVID period was intentionally excluded from model training — including it would have caused extreme unemployment levels to dominate the model and distort sensitivity to other risk factors. 

Figure 5: NonQM Credit Model — Current to 30DPD Transition: Actual vs. Projection by Documentation Type 

A dedicated webinar covering CM 7.1 in detail is planned for end of May or early June. Please stay tuned. 

Housing Turnover Analysis: Rate Sensitivity at Positive Refinancing Incentive 

Shane Lee from the Quantitative Modeling team presented new research on housing turnover behavior in a positive refinancing incentive environment. 

Background 

Total prepayment has two components: housing turnover (prepayment driven by home sales) and refinancing. In current model design, housing turnover is assumed to be weakly rate sensitive — and in the positive refinancing incentive regime, sensitivity is held at zero. The question the team set out to answer: is that assumption correct? 

Data Sources 

  • NAR: National Association of Realtors (NAR) Existing Home Sales — measures the number of homes sold including single-family, condo, and co-op properties (including sales without mortgages) 
  • Equifax ADS: Equifax ADS Data — tracks trade lines per consumer, allowing the team to identify housing turnover by flagging cases where an existing mortgage closes and a new mortgage originates at a different ZIP code for the same borrower 

Figure 6: ADS vs. NAR Data Comparison — Prepaid Mortgages vs. Home Sale Units 

Key Finding 

During the post-COVID refinancing boom, housing turnover activity increased significantly — by almost 50% above the baseline level. This elevated turnover coincided with the period of low rates and high refinancing activity, driven in part by the work-from-home migration wave. 

Figure 7: Housing Turnover CPR — ADS Data (nearly 50% above baseline during COVID refi boom) 

This finding suggests that housing turnover is more rate-sensitive in a positive refinancing incentive environment than current models assume — a potential source of underestimation when projecting prepayment speeds in a low-rate environment. Research is underway to incorporate this into Prepayment 4.0. 

Macroeconomic Update: April 2026 

Federal Reserve — No Rate Cuts Expected in 2026 

CME FedWatch futures currently indicate no Federal Reserve rate cuts this year. The overall expectation is that the Fed funds rate (currently 350–375 bps) will remain unchanged through year-end 2026. 

Figure 8: Federal Funds Target Range — Upper Limit (Source: FRED) 

Mortgage Rates — Elevated and Volatile 

Mortgage rates hit a six-month high in March, with Freddie Mac’s primary rate reaching 6.45% and Mortgage News Daily data showing rates approaching 6.64%. Rates have since pulled back modestly as some geopolitical uncertainty subsided. The 10-year Treasury rate is expected by market consensus (econforecasting.com) to remain above 4% for the next three to five years — implying mortgage rates are unlikely to fall significantly below 6%. 

Figure 9: 10-Year Treasury Yield — Historical and Market Consensus Forecast 

Figure 10: Primary Mortgage Rate Trend 

Unemployment and Inflation 

  • March unemployment rate: 4.3% — trending upward 
  • PCE (excluding food and energy): approximately 3% — still above the Fed’s 2% target 

Figure 11: Unemployment Rate 

Figure 12: PCE Inflation (ex. Food & Energy) 

Consumers continue to face pressure from elevated gasoline and oil prices. Credit card balances have risen significantly over the past two years, adding to the financial strain on households. 

Home Prices — Stabilizing but Elevated 

Home price growth remains positive but has decelerated substantially from the 20%+ year-over-year peaks observed in mid-2022: 

  • Case-Shiller National Index: approximately 1% year-over-year growth 
  • 10-City Composite: slightly above the national index 
  • FHFA All-Transaction Index: somewhat stronger, indicating variation across market segments 

Figure 13: Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index — Year-over-Year % Change 

Two regional case studies highlight the range of outcomes: Austin, TX and Boise, ID both experienced peak growth of 30–35% in 2021–2022, followed by sharp declines through 2023, and are now returning to modest positive territory. Housing supply remains severely constrained. 

Summary 

Topic Key Takeaway 
Prepayment Model Performing well overall; March speeds driven by February rate rally and day count effects 
GNMA Segmentation New FHA/VA split available in Vertex; FHA drift tied to 2025 trial mod policy change 
NonQM Credit Model CM 7.1 on track for end of Q2 2026; dedicated webinar coming end of May / early June 
Housing Turnover Rate sensitivity confirmed in positive refi regime; ~50% above baseline during low-rate period; research underway for Prepayment 4.0 
Mortgage Rates Hit six-month high of 6.64% in March; expected to remain above 6% through 2026–27 
Fed Policy No rate cuts expected in 2026; Fed funds rate at 350–375 bps 
Home Prices Growth slowing (~1% nationally); supply constraints persist 


We continue to add additional analytics reports on the Platform. Please visit www.riskspan.com/request-access to request free access. 

As always, please feel free to contact us to discuss or learn more.


Models & Markets Update: March 2026 

Register here for next month’s call: Thursday, April 16th, 2026, 1 p.m. ET.

Key takeaways from this month’s call: 

  • Non-mortgage credit is deteriorating more rapidly than mortgage credit 
  • BNPL usage may be masking underlying financial strain 
  • Macroeconomic conditions are likely to remain restrictive, reinforcing current trends 
  • Prepayment models remain well-calibrated, even as borrower behavior begins to shift 

You can read the recap below or click here for the entire 20-minute recording.  

Credit Performance by Asset Class 

The data shows a clear divergence between mortgage and non-mortgage credit: 

  • Mortgage delinquencies remain relatively low, supported by tighter underwriting standards 
  • Credit card delinquencies have increased meaningfully since 2022 
  • Auto loan delinquencies are approaching levels observed during the Global Financial Crisis, particularly among younger borrowers  

The following charts from NYFed illustrate how younger age cohorts are consistently exhibiting higher delinquency rates across credit types (mortgages, credit cards, and autos). 

BNPL Usage as a Potential Blind Spot 

Buy Now, Pay Later (BNPL) usage continues to expand. 

Adoption is highest among younger borrowers. 

A meaningful portion of usage is for essential expenses such as groceries  

Because BNPL obligations are not consistently captured in traditional credit metrics, they may obscure underlying levels of consumer leverage and stress. 

Macroeconomic Outlook: Rates Expected to Remain Elevated 

The macroeconomic environment continues to support a “higher-for-longer” rate outlook. 

  • Market expectations suggest no Federal Reserve rate cuts through 2026. 
  • The 10-year Treasury rate is expected to remain above 4% over the next several years. 
  • Mortgage rates, after declining earlier in 2026, have risen again and are expected to remain near or above 6%. 

At the same time: 

  • Inflation remains above target levels 
  • Unemployment is trending upward  

These conditions suggest a continued tightening backdrop for borrowers, with limited relief from monetary policy in the near term. 

Housing Market: Moderation Continues 

Home price growth remains positive but has slowed: 

  • Case-Shiller index shows modest annual growth (~1.3%) 
  • FHFA index indicates somewhat stronger growth (~3.3%)  

Differences between indices suggest variation across market segments, with relatively stronger performance in more affordable segments and geographic differences on home prices. 

Against this macro and consumer backdrop, prepayment behavior continues to evolve. 

  • Prepayment models remain closely aligned with realized speeds across FN/FH and GNMA collateral, as shown in the coupon-level comparisons.  
  • Refinance behavior is well captured, including sensitivity to changes in mortgage rates.  

There are, however, early indications of shifting borrower behavior: 

  • Prepayment speeds increased in February despite fewer collection days, suggesting a gradual weakening of the mortgage rate “lock-in” effect.  
  • Short-term rate increases may moderate this trend, but the directional change is notable. 

GNMA Segmentation Enhancements 

The introduction of FHA and VA segmentation in GNMA back-testing provides additional analytical detail. 

FHA performance shows some divergence, likely reflecting recent policy changes affecting delinquent loan buyouts. 

VA results are more sensitive to spread assumptions and can be adjusted to align with market conditions. 


We continue to add additional analytics reports on the Platform. Please visit www.riskspan.com/request-access to request free access. 

As always, please feel free to contact us to discuss or learn more.


From Household Debt to Non-QM Credit: February Models & Markets Recap 

Register here for next month’s call: Thursday, March 19th, 2026, 1 p.m. ET. 

In this month’s Models & Markets call, RiskSpan’s quantitative modeling team tackled: 

  • The record debt levels now carried by U.S. households (and the consumer stress that is building beneath the surface); 
  • The likely persistence of higher rates; 
  • RiskSpan’s forthcoming non-QM credit model, and; 
  • (as always) how RiskSpan’s prepayment model is performing 

You can read the recap below or click here for the entire 20-minute recording.  

$18 Trillion in Household Debt (and Growing) 

 U.S. household debt reached $18.8 trillion at the end of 2025 and continues to climb. Mortgages account for the largest share at roughly $13 trillion, with auto loans, student loans, credit cards, and HELOCs making up the balance. 

Using conservative assumptions for average interest rates for each category, we estimate that these balances equate to roughly $1.1 trillion in annual interest payments and $2.5 trillion in total annual debt service payments – the approximate cost required each year just to keep households current. 

A Distributional Problem

The aggregate debt figure masks meaningful stress at the lower end of the income spectrum: 

  • A median household (~$80K gross income) may devote roughly 37% of disposable income to debt service. 
  • Bottom-quartile households (~$32K gross income) may spend 40–55% of disposable income servicing debt. 

Lower-income households are disproportionately exposed to higher-rate revolving credit and subprime auto loans, as opposed to 3–4% fixed-rate mortgages. The averages therefore understate the severity of strain on the more vulnerable segments. 

Are Reported Delinquencies Understating Stress?

Delinquencies are rising across income levels, particularly in lower-income areas. Lenders, however, may be quietly modifying or re-aging loans, particularly in consumer credit categories (e.g., auto loans). Such modifications can: 

  • Push missed payments to the back of the loan 
  • Reset accounts to “current” status 
  • Avoid immediate charge-offs 

While this suppresses reported delinquency statistics, borrower balances may continue to grow. This implies that reported delinquency rates may really be more of a floor, as aggregate DSCR and household stress may be greatly understated. 

Consumer strain is real and potentially worse than what is suggested by the headline metrics. 

Coming in Q2: RiskSpan’s Non-QM Credit Model! 

RiskSpan’s forthcoming non-QM credit model will feature four distinct documentation categories: 

  1. Bank Statement 
  1. Full Documentation 
  1. DSCR/Investor 
  1. Other (e.g., VOE, asset depletion) 

Each segment is modeled independently through a transition-matrix framework covering: 

  • Current 
  • 30-day DQ 
  • 60-day DQ 
  • 90+ DQ 
  • Termination (voluntary and involuntary) 

Prior delinquency figures prominently in the model, with clean loans having relatively low base transition rates from current to delinquent, while loans with prior delinquency history can experience transition probabilities up to 10x higher. Capturing this conditional risk dynamic is central to the model’s design. 

Back-testing (shown below for the Full Doc segment) indicates the model is tracking historical delinquency transition rates reasonably well, though development remains ongoing.

Macro Considerations

Consistent with prior months, the macro backdrop continues to reinforce a “higher-for-longer” rate environment. 

Fed and Policy Outlook 

  • Fed Funds expectations imply limited cuts in 2026. 
  • No immediate expectation of a March rate cut. 

10-Year Treasury 

  • Consensus forecasts suggest the 10-year Treasury will remain above 4% for the next 2–3 years. 
  • Recently, it has hovered around ~4.1%, down slightly from prior highs. 

Mortgage Rates 

Primary mortgage rates are approaching 6%, but not sustainably breaking below it. In our view, mortgage rates are likely to remain around or above 6% through 2026, possibly into 2027. 

Labor, Inflation, and Home Prices 

  • Unemployment ticked down slightly. 
  • Job creation surprised to the upside. 
  • Inflation remains sticky in the 2.5–3% range  
  • National home prices showed modest year-over-year growth (~1.4%). 

Traditional seasonal adjustments may be less reliable in today’s inventory-constrained housing market. Turnover seasonality appears to be shifting earlier in the year, with implications for both pricing and prepayment dynamics. 

Prepayment Model Performance: Stable & Improving

Despite macro headwinds and rising consumer stress, RiskSpan’s prepayment models continue to perform well. 

GSE Discounts (WAC 5.5 and Below)

Prepayments declined slightly in the most recent month, primarily due to fewer collection days and normal January seasonality (lower turnover). Overall model fit remains strong. 

One identified refinement: the model’s seasonal peak appears slightly delayed (June/July shifting toward August). This will be addressed in the next version update 

GSE Premiums (WAC 6 and Above)

Refinance speeds have been largely unchanged over the past two months. S-curve comparisons between December and January show no material differences once recount adjustments are made. A modest ~1.5 CPR change in recent data appears driven by turnover rather than refi activity.

Ginnie Mae: FHA vs. VA Enhancement

Performance across Ginnie segments remains solid, with recent prepayment dips again attributable to fewer collection days. However, we have observed divergence between FHA and VA: Modeled FHA speeds tend to be overestimated, while modeled VA speeds tend to be underestimated compared to recent historicals.

To address this, RiskSpan is adding a loan guarantor filter to the back-testing report, enabling FHA and VA splits (expected early March). This enhancement will improve transparency and precision in Ginnie performance analysis.


We continue to add additional analytics reports on the Platform. Please visit www.riskspan.com/request-access to request free access. 

As always, please feel free to contact us to discuss or learn more. 


Why AI Won’t Kill Asset-Backed Finance Software — and Why the Last Mile is the Moat

Every wave of financial technology innovation brings the same prediction: software will be commoditized. Today, that prediction is being applied to AI. If AI models can reason, summarize, and generate code, the thinking goes, B2B vertical SaaS becomes unnecessary. 

That conclusion is inherently wrong. ABF platforms are not feature layers, they are governed systems.  

The last mile of AI deployment isn’t friction—it’s the moat. 

ABF Is Not a “Promptable” Problem 

ABF platforms sit directly in the flow of capital allocation, risk management, and regulation. For asset managers deploying institutional capital, this creates a very high bar for reliable data, validated models and domain-specific workflow.  

The real question isn’t whether a system can produce answers. It’s whether it can produce results that are: 

  • Consistent over reporting periods and market cycles 
  • Explainable under stress and investor scrutiny 
  • Defensible and robust enough for LPs, investment committees, and regulators 

That high bar changes everything. It explains why technology adoption in financial markets moves cautiously and why legacy systems persist. These systems embed decision rights, controls, and institutional logic that can’t simply be recreated with better prompts. Any platform that ignores this reality will struggle to scale beyond pilots. 

Which leads to the obvious question: if AI is so powerful, where does it actually help? 

AI Accelerates Workflow — Not Accountability 

Applied correctly, AI can materially improve ABF workflows. It can ingest complex credit agreements faster, reconcile data across counterparties, flag covenant breaches, and reduce manual reporting work. In other words, AI increases operational leverage. 

But AI does not remove the need for explicit deployment configuration and governance. Institutions still must define who owns key assumptions, which decisions can be automated, and where accountability sits when outcomes affect capital. These embedded design choices (not prompts) ultimately determine whether a platform is trusted. 

AI compresses timelines, but responsibility remains fixed. Once this distinction is recognized, the broader implication becomes clear: AI does not eliminate the need for software. It raises the bar for it. 

Software Remains the System of Record 

The idea that AI replaces SaaS also misunderstands where SaaS enterprise value lives. Enterprise value in ABF doesn’t live in isolated insights. It lives in controlled systems of record and durable platforms that provide: 

  • Governed data and the system of record 
  • Embedded domain expertise 
  • Repeatable processes that survive personnel turnover 
  • A shared source of truth across counterparties, investment, risk, accounting, and investor relations 

AI without software discipline creates speed without stability. With it, AI becomes force-multiplying. The question, then, is what separates platforms that successfully integrate AI from those that don’t. 

The Real Differentiator: Deployment Intelligence at Scale 

What separates enduring platforms from feature-rich tools is not model sophistication—it’s deployment intelligence — the ability to integrate AI into live production environments without weakening controls. That requires: 

  • Controlled data pipelines designed for real-world imperfections 
  • Configuration layers that adapt to fund-specific structures without breaking controls 
  • AI outputs that are transparent, and auditable 
  • Implementation treated as a repeatable product, not bespoke services 

This is where defensibility emerges. Deployment intelligence compounds with each client rollout. Each successful implementation strengthens the next, deepening institutional trust and operational resilience. AI amplifies this flywheel but cannot replace it. 

The Mispriced Risk of “AI-Only” Narratives 

In private credit, trust is earned slowly and lost quickly. It is built through consistent valuations, defensible reporting, and reliability during market dislocations. 

A system that produces faster answers, but weaker confidence does not displace incumbents. It increases operational and reputational risk. Investors should be wary of platforms that promise instant replacement without acknowledging institutional reality of fiduciary-grade infrastructure. 

The Investment Takeaway 

AI is not commoditizing ABF software solutions. It is widening the moat for platforms that integrate AI responsibly into governed systems. 

The next phase of growth for category leaders such as RiskSpan will be driven by combining deep domain knowledge with AI-native architecture. Leaders will treat the last mile – data integration, workflow configuration, and control design — as a core product capability, not an implementation afterthought. 

In markets where trillions in capital allocation depend on data integrity and institutional trust, the last mile isn’t an implementation detail. 

It’s the moat. 


Rates, Prepays and Consumer Stress: What the Data is Telling Us at the Start of 2026

Register here for next month’s call: Thursday, February 19th, 2026, 1 p.m. ET. 

In the January Models & Markets call, our quantitative modeling team hosts their first monthly deep dive of the year into prepayment model performance, an updated analysis of second liens and HELOCs using Equifax data, and the evolving macroeconomic backdrop shaping mortgage markets. 

Here’s a quick recap in case you missed it. 

(Click here for the entire 20-minute recording or continue reading for a summary.)  

Revised HELOC and HEL Results Using Equifax ADS Data

  We performed a comprehensive analysis of second liens and HELOCs using Equifax’s Analytic Data Set (ADS), which represents a 10% anonymized sample of U.S. consumer credit data at the tradeline level. 

Following the resolution of data quality issues identified in an earlier analysis, the revised results now align much more closely with economic intuition. Prepayment speeds behave consistently across vintages, credit score bands, and refinancing regimes. 

One key takeaway holds that higher credit score borrowers tend to prepay faster, particularly during refinancing waves, while lower credit score segments remain slower. This pattern is especially evident in post-COVID vintages. Overall credit quality for HELOCs and second liens remains strong, with performance clustering closer to the highest credit score bands. 

Another notable observation is the role of seasonality in newer HELOC vintages. In a high-rate environment with limited refinancing activity, turnover-driven prepayments become more prominent. Baseline prepayment speeds for HELOCs are running around 15 CPR, higher than what is typically observed in first-lien portfolios under similar conditions. These dynamics provide useful signals for understanding how first-lien behavior may differ when second liens or HELOCs are present on the same property. 

  We plan to expand this analysis further, including deeper investigation into correlations between first- and second-lien prepayment behavior. 

Mortgage Rates Remain Likely to Stay Higher for Longer 

The broader economic outlook remains one of persistence rather than relief. Federal Reserve projections point to unemployment stabilizing around the low-4% range and real GDP growth near 2% over the medium term. Meanwhile, expectations for the fed funds rate suggest limited room for significant cuts beyond 2026. 

Longer-term rates tell a similar story. Consensus forecasts indicate the 10-year Treasury is unlikely to fall meaningfully below 4% over the next two to three years, implying mortgage rates are likely to remain near (and potentially above) the 6% level for much of the period ahead. Temporary dips tied to policy announcements or market events have proven short-lived, with rates quickly reverting back toward recent levels. 

Consumer Stress Continues to Build 

While headline spending remained strong during the most recent holiday season, the composition of that spending tells a more cautious story. Consumers increasingly favored lower-cost retailers, suggesting budget sensitivity and selective spending behavior. 

Survey data reinforces this theme. Year-over-year consumer sentiment and expectations have declined meaningfully, and perceptions of job insecurity (particularly among college-educated workers) have become more negative. These dynamics could have important implications for credit performance and housing activity as economic uncertainty persists. 

Prepayment Model Performance: v. 3.7 Continuing to Track Market Performance Well 

RiskSpan’s prepayment models continue to perform well across Agency collateral. 

RiskSpan’s Prepayment Model v3.7 continues to demonstrate strong performance across collateral types. Recent back-testing shows that model projections remain closely aligned with realized speeds, even as seasonal effects and calendar nuances influence month-to-month results. 

For conventional 30-year loans with lower coupons, December’s modest uptick in observed CPRs was largely attributable to four additional collection days relative to November. After adjusting for day count effects, actual prepayment speeds continue to trend lower, consistent with expectations in a higher-rate environment. 

Premium cohorts also remained largely stable. Despite a brief decline in mortgage rates late last year, the move was insufficient to trigger a meaningful new refinance wave. Most refinance-eligible borrowers have already acted, and the refinancing “pull-forward” effect appears largely exhausted. This dynamic is also visible in the S-curve, which has flattened back toward historical averages after October’s temporary acceleration. 

Agency collateral shows similar patterns. Ginnie Mae discount cohorts tracked model expectations closely, while premium cohorts remained flat. One area of ongoing refinement is deep in-the-money, very high-coupon Ginnie Mae loans, where actual speeds have run slightly slower than model projections as refinance incentives flatten out earlier than in prior cycles. 

Looking Ahead 

In summary: 

  • RiskSpan’s Prepayment Model v3.7 continues to perform well across most collateral segments 
  • HELOC and second-lien analysis using Equifax data now shows economically intuitive and stable results 
  • Mortgage rates are likely to remain near 6% in the absence of a major macro shock 
  • Consumer behavior is showing increasing signs of stress and caution 
  • RiskSpan plans to release additional analytics later this year, including a new non-QM credit model in the first half of the year and a next-generation prepayment model in the second half. 

We continue to add additional analytics reports on the Platform. Please visit www.riskspan.com/request-access to request free access. 

As always, please feel free to contact us to discuss or learn more. 


What a Year of Building AI in Structured Finance Actually Taught Us 

The lessons nobody puts in the demo. 

In 2025, our team built production AI systems that process billions of performance records for tens of millions of mortgages, develop cash flow models for complex private ABF structures directly from documents, and connect large language models directly to bond analytics APIs. 

We built dashboards, connectors, and credit analytics. Some of them worked. Some of them taught us more by failing. 

This is what we learned—not the polished conference talk version, but the notes we’d share with a peer team starting the same journey. 

The Value Shift Nobody Prepares You For 

A portfolio delinquency analysis that used to take three hours now takes twenty minutes. 

That sounds like a win. It is a win. But it also raises a question that’s harder to answer than any technical problem we solved this year: 

If AI handles in minutes what took us hours, what are we contributing? 

When we started pulling this thread, we realized that a significant portion of what felt like skilled analytical work was actually mechanical labor—data extraction, formatting, applying the same methodology we’d applied dozens of times before. The expertise was real, but it was wrapped in hours of execution that masked how much of the work was routine. 

Here’s where we landed: 

AI handles the “how.” Humans own the “why” and “so what.” 

The value now lives in knowing which questions matter. Understanding what the client really needs versus what they say they need. Recognizing when output is wrong because we understand the domain deeply enough to see the error. 

That’s an entirely different skill set. It requires judgment, contextual awareness, and domain intuition that deepens over years—the kind of expertise AI can’t simply replicate, unlike procedural analytical work.

Not everyone will make this transition comfortably. The analysts who built their identity around being fast and thorough at execution face a harder adjustment than those who always saw execution as a means to an end. 

We don’t have this all figured out yet. But we’ve stopped pretending the shift isn’t happening. 

Stop Asking AI to Write Code—Start Asking It to Think With You 

For years, we used Claude as a coding assistant. “Write a function that does X.” “Convert this data from format A to format B.” “Generate a script that calculates Y.” 

That works. But it captures maybe 20% of the value. 

The shift that changed our results was: treating Claude not as a tool to instruct, but as an analyst to think alongside. 

The difference looks like this: 

Before (instruction mode): 

“Write a Python script to calculate delinquency rates from this loan data.” 

After (thinking partner mode): 

“We need to identify hidden credit risk in this CLO portfolio—issuers that resemble recent defaults but haven’t shown price distress yet. What factors should we consider? What data would we need? Let’s build a scoring model together.” 

That second conversation led to identifying hidden exposure across issuers. Claude suggested factors we hadn’t considered—CLO concentration patterns, industry clustering effects, the relationship between coupon levels and distress signals. We debated the weighting. We refined the methodology. The output was genuinely collaborative. 

The code that emerged from the second approach was better, but that’s almost beside the point. The thinking was better. The model was better. The insight was better. 

This requires a different posture than most of us learned. You have to think out loud. Admit what you don’t know. Explain your reasoning and invite critique. Treat the AI as a colleague who happens to have read every document and doesn’t get tired—not as a sophisticated autocomplete. 

The developers and analysts on our team who made this shift produce substantively different work than those who are still in instruction mode. And the gap is widening. 

The First Version Will Be Wrong—Plan for It 

We built a benchmark analysis comparing a client’s NonQM loan portfolio against the broader market. The analysis looked solid: the portfolio showed a 1.37% delinquency rate advantage versus the universe. Strong results. Ready to present. 

Then someone asked about DSCR loans. 

In NonQM lending, DSCR (debt service coverage ratio) loans are a category unto themselves—with measurably better performance than other NonQM products. When we segmented the data, we discovered the universe was comprised of 43% DSCR loans while the client’s portfolio had only 30% DSCR loans. 

This changed everything. 

The client’s portfolio had less exposure to DSCR loans (the better-performing segment) yet still outperformed the benchmark. That alone was impressive, but our initial analysis understated the true picture. Once we compared performance within segments (DSCR vs. DSCR, non-DSCR vs. non-DSCR), the client’s edge was even larger than we’d initially observed. 

If we had presented the first version, we would have undersold our client’s own performance. The insight that mattered most—superior underwriting across both loan categories—would have been invisible. 

Lesson: “Wrong” doesn’t mean broken. It means the output doesn’t fully reflect reality. Have a domain expert review the work before drawing conclusions. 

Deploying AI Agents for End Users Is a Security Project 

Building an AI agent that works in a demo is straightforward. Deploying that agent in a production UI where real users interact with real data took us months. 

We built an agent that lets users query our bond analytics platform conversationally. The AI worked. Making it production-ready required solving problems: 

Prompt injection: When users can type anything into a text box processed by an LLM, you inherit a new attack surface. We implemented input validation, output filtering, tightly scoped permissions, and logging that captures every agent action for audit. 

Rate limiting: A single conversational turn might trigger 50 API calls. We built tiered limits—per-user, per-session, per-token—plus circuit breakers for runaway queries. 

Session management: Agent sessions need conversational context across multiple turns, isolated per user, with graceful expiration handling and automatic cleanup. 

Audit trails: Regulated industries need to know what the AI did. Every query, tool invocation, and response needs to be logged immutably. 

The agent itself was 20% of the effort. Authentication, authorization, input validation, rate limiting, session management, and security review were the other 80%. 

Lesson: In production, the agent is the easy part. The security wrapper is the product. 

Post script: AgentCore from AWS and Agent Framework from Microsoft are solving the deployment and security headaches.  

AI Is Good at Finding Information But Sometimes Overstates What It Means 

While building the credit risk analysis, we asked Claude to research distressed issuers—companies that had defaulted or were showing signs of stress. We wanted to understand patterns we could use to identify similar risks in the portfolio. 

Claude surfaced real-time signals we wouldn’t have found efficiently on our own: FTC antitrust actions, rating agency downgrades, refinancing walls, fraud allegations. Information that wouldn’t appear in pricing data for months was available in news coverage and regulatory filings. The research phase that would have taken days was completed in hours. 

But we also caught Claude drawing confident conclusions from weak sources. In one case, it attributed claims to “industry reports” that didn’t exist when we followed the links. The search results were real. The sources were ‘real’. But the synthesis drew conclusions the sources didn’t support. 

The lesson: use AI-powered search aggressively. It’s the difference between stale knowledge and current intelligence, especially in fast-moving situations. But verify specific claims. Click the links. Read the actual sources. 

AI is excellent at finding relevant information across large volumes of text. It is sometimes too confident about what that information means when synthesized. The combination of broad retrieval and skeptical verification is more powerful than either alone. 

Your Org Chart Isn’t Ready for This 

Our AI strategy deck included projections: reduction in onboarding costs, increased client capacity and margin expansion. 

The numbers were defensible. The business case was clear. 

What the projections didn’t address: the organizational implications of realizing the promised efficiencies. 

If analysts can serve five times more clients, do you need fewer analysts—or do you pursue five times more clients? If the answer is “more clients,” do you have the sales capacity? The support infrastructure? The management bandwidth? 

If developers now own adoption metrics for the features they build, then what happens to the product managers who previously owned that? Are product managers freed up for more strategic work, or are they defending territory? 

If AI drafts client communications, who reviews them? What error rate are we willing to accept? Who’s accountable when the AI gets something wrong? 

These aren’t hypothetical questions. We’re navigating them now, and the answers aren’t obvious. 

AI doesn’t just improve workflows. It reshapes roles. And most organizations—including ours—are making it up as they go. 

The companies that figure out the organizational design will outperform those that simply purchase better software. The differentiation in 2026 won’t come from adopting AI. It will come from redesigning teams, incentives, and accountability structures around what AI makes newly possible. 

What We’re Taking Into Next Year 

A year of building AI systems in structured finance clarified a few things: 

AI is more powerful than the hype suggests—once you integrate it into real workflows rather than treating it as a research toy. 

AI is more frustrating than the demos show—the gap between “works in claude.ai” and “works in production” is where most of the time goes. 

AI is more dependent on domain expertise than the automation narrative implies—it generates analyses quickly, but distinguishing plausible from accurate requires human judgement that compounds over years. The “why” and “so what” remain stubbornly human problems.  

AI changes more than technology—it changes job descriptions, team structures, and how people understand their own value. The skill isn’t operating the tool; it’s knowing when the output reflects reality. 

We don’t have all the answers. We’re still learning what this means for how we build software, how we serve clients, and how we organize ourselves. 

But we’re no longer wondering whether AI will change our industry. We’re focused on making sure we’re the ones defining how. 


Higher for Longer: What RiskSpan’s December Models & Markets Call Signals for 2026 

Register here for this month’s call: Thursday, January 22nd, 2026, 1 p.m. ET. 

Just before the holidays, RiskSpan’s quantitative modeling team hosted its December Models & Markets call, offering its monthly, detailed look at prepayment model performance, evolving macroeconomic conditions, and what to expect in 2026. Led by Shane Lee and Divas Sanwal, the discussion highlighted a housing and credit market navigating elevated rates, slowing growth, and increasing consumer stress. 

Here’s a quick recap in case you missed it. 

(Click here for the entire 24-minute recording or continue reading for a summary.)  

Why Rate Cuts Aren’t Lowering Mortgage Rates 

Although the Federal Reserve delivered multiple rate cuts toward the end of 2025, the Fed Funds rate remains in the 350–375 basis point range, with futures markets expecting only gradual additional cuts in 2026. As the following charts and tables illustrate, even a move toward 300–325 bps next year leaves policy rates well above pre-pandemic norms. 

More importantly for housing, longer-term rates continue to dominate mortgage pricing. Market consensus forecasts presented on the slides show the 10-year Treasury remaining above 4% for the next two to three years, a view that has remained remarkably stable across forecasting sources. As a result, mortgage rates have been largely unchanged over recent months despite easing monetary policy. 

The implication is clear: refinance and cash-out activity remain extremely constrained and are likely to stay that way well into 2026. Any incremental increase in prepayment activity will come principally from turnover, not rate-driven refinancing. 

Home Prices: Growth Slows, Regional Divergence Emerges 

We used unadjusted Case-Shiller and FHFA data to highlight that month-over-month home prices declined across many large metro areas, even where seasonally adjusted figures appear more stable. Seasonal patterns have shifted materially in recent years, making unadjusted trends especially informative. 

The FHFA four-quarter appreciation map illustrated this growing regional dispersion. Parts of the Sun Belt, including California, Texas, and Florida, have experienced notable price declines, with the Fort Myers area standing out as a recent weak spot. At the same time, select Northeast markets continue to see positive appreciation, with areas near New York showing some of the strongest gains. 

Overall, while a broad-based housing downturn has not materialized, slowing appreciation reduces borrowers’ financial flexibility and reinforces the current lock-in environment. 

Consumers Under Pressure 

As has been a recurring theme in several of our recent monthly calls, the consumer credit environment is showing increasing signs of strain. 

Unemployment has edged higher, reaching 4.6% in November, with younger workers (ages 16–25) experiencing disproportionately higher joblessness. Inflation, while easing slightly, remains stubbornly above target, with recent CPI readings still near 2.7% year over year. 

We are also continuing to see historically high levels of consumer debt and a notable slowdown in spending growth. Unlike typical holiday-season patterns, consumer spending has not accelerated meaningfully, suggesting households are becoming more selective and cautious. 

One particularly telling trend is the rapid growth of buy now, pay later (BNPL) usage. Increasing reliance on BNPL for essential purchases points to tighter household budgets and reduced financial resilience. 

Taken together, these indicators support expectations—also shown in the Fed’s December Summary of Economic Projections—that GDP growth is likely to remain near or below 2% over the next several years, while credit performance warrants close monitoring. 

Prepayment Model Performance: Holding Up Across Collateral Types 

RiskSpan’s prepayment models continue to perform well across Agency collateral. 

For Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pools with WACs of 5.5% and below, observed turnover speeds declined modestly month over month. As highlighted below, this softness largely reflects seasonal effects and a shorter reporting month. While the model projected slightly higher speeds, overall alignment with observed behavior remained strong. 

For higher-coupon GSE collateral (6.0% and above), December marked a normalization following unusually aggressive prepayment speeds observed in the prior month. As shown in the charts, observed speeds moderated, allowing the model to close the gap and better track realized behavior. 

A similar pattern emerged in the Ginnie Mae collateral, with both discounted and premium coupon cohorts showing improved alignment between modeled and observed speeds. In particular, the moderation in higher-coupon Ginnie Mae prepayments mirrored trends seen in the GSE universe, underscoring the consistency of borrower behavior across agency channels. 

During Q&A, the team also addressed VA loan performance. Internal loan-level analysis suggests VA loans tend to prepay faster than baseline model projections, an area RiskSpan continues to evaluate closely.  

Looking Ahead: 2025 in Review and What’s Coming in 2026 

In 2025, RiskSpan delivered several major Platform enhancements: 

  • Prepayment Model v3.7, introducing an out-of-the-money (OTM) slope to better capture turnover lock-in effects 
  • Prepayment Model v3.8, adding a new ARM sub-model and additional tuning controls 
  • Prepayment Model v3.11, a fully redeveloped framework for non-QM collateral 
  • Credit Model v7.0, featuring a full delinquency transition matrix for GSE and Ginnie Mae loans 

Looking ahead, we outlined an ambitious 2026 release schedule, including: 

  • A Non-QM Credit Model v7.1 with full delinquency transitions, expected in the first half of the year 
  • A broader non-agency credit model later in 2026 
  • A completely new prepayment framework—currently referred to as Prepayment Model 4.0—built from the ground up 

We continue to add additional analytics reports on the Platform. Please visit www.riskspan.com/request-access to request free access. 

As always, please feel free to contact us to discuss or learn more. 


Are Lock-In Effects Really Easing? Insights from November’s Models & Markets Call

Register here for next month’s call: Thursday, December 18th, 2025, 1 p.m. ET. 

Each month, we host a Models & Markets call to offer our insights into recent model performance, emerging credit risks, and broader economic indicators. This month’s call reviewed recent prepayment performance, presented new research on identifying cash-out refinance activity in GSE data, and walked through key macroeconomic and consumer-debt indicators shaping mortgage behavior going into 2026. 

Here’s a quick recap in case you missed it. 

(Click here for the entire 24-minute recording or continue reading for a summary.)  

New Research: Estimating Cash-Out Refinance Activity Using GSE Data 

Cash-out refinance is a component of prepayment modeling that has traditionally been difficult to observe directly. Shane Lee explained how we have been getting at it using publicly available GSE performance data.

Originations vs. Prepayments: Understanding the Gaps 

Voluntary prepayments consist of turnover, rate-refinance, and cash-out refinance components. While originations include a loan-purpose indicator (“purchase,” “refinance,” “cash-out”), payoff data does not. 

Nationally, the gap between prepaid loan counts and contemporaneous originations is significant, especially in earlier years. This is driven in part by new construction, properties without existing liens, and cross-region relocations. 

To improve attribution, our team has been evaluating data at the ZIP3 level, where prepay and origination volumes show much tighter alignment. Shane presented examples, including ZIPs near Ventura, Tucson, St. Louis, Boulder, and Austin, demonstrating that refinances and cash-outs can be reasonably inferred when prepaid loan totals track closely with origination totals in the same geography. 

Where origination and prepay counts align well, origination loan-purpose shares can serve as a proxy for prepay-purpose shares, enabling estimation of the cash-out fraction among prepaid loans. 

Prepayment Model Performance: Stable Overall, With Pockets of Divergence

Guanlin Chen presented a review of our v3.7 model back-testing results. In summary: 

Low-Coupon (≤5.5%) Conventional and Ginnie Cohorts 

Actual October CPRs tracked the model closely for low-coupon pools across Fannie, Freddie, and Ginnie. October’s slight upward movement in discount speeds (which the model had projected to decline) was explained by a calendar effect: one additional collection day offset typical seasonal slowdown. 

When adjusting for day-count, both actual and projected CPRs show similar downward trends. The alignment reinforced Guanlin’s point that lock-in remains firmly intact. Despite lower rates during parts of October, borrowers with sub-4% or low-4% mortgages still show little inclination to refinance, consistent with recent months. 

High-Coupon (≥6%) Cohorts: Speeds Running Hotter Than Expected 

The premium sector told a different story. Borrowers holding 6%–7% coupons responded more aggressively to rate movements than historical incentive-matched periods would suggest. The S-curve steepened further in October, with realized CPRs meaningfully exceeding v3.7 model predictions. 

To address this, RiskSpan’s v3.8 prepayment model introduces a configurable “in-the-money multiplier” that allows users to steepen the S-curve to better capture this more responsive behavior. 

Outliers and Ongoing Calibrations 

While most premium segments prepaid faster than expected, deep-in-the-money Ginnies (WAC >7%) actually prepaid slower than v3.7 projected. We are actively evaluating updated calibration approaches for these cohorts. 

Market Indicators: Rates, Labor Markets, Home Prices, and the Fed 

Mortgage News Daily data showed a recent ~25bp increase in the 30-year fixed rate. The prevailing question on clients’ minds—“Where do rates go from here?”—was addressed via futures and FedWatch probability data: 

  • Fed Funds futures suggest the policy rate will likely remain unchanged in December, despite fresh unemployment data. 
  • Projections show the 10-year Treasury hovering around 4% for the next several years, implying mortgage rates likely remain above 6% through 2026. 

Labor Market Softening 

The latest (delayed) September unemployment rate rose to 4.4%. Rising unemployment, paired with persistent inflation pressures, creates a challenging backdrop for housing demand. 

Home Price Growth Slowing Nationally 

Case-Shiller data, nationally and across metros, showed: 

  • A 0.3% month-over-month national decline in the latest reading. 
  • Major metros increasingly showing broad-based price deterioration, with formerly resilient cities like Los Angeles slipping negative. 

While inventory is rising toward a buyer-leaning market, transaction volumes remain soft. 

Consumer Debt: Elevated, Shifting & Stress-Inducing 

Debt rose $200B quarter-over-quarter, with long-term increases far outpacing inflation and population growth in several categories: 

  • Student loans: +600% since 2003 
  • Mortgage balances: +165% 
  • Auto loans: similarly elevated 

Inflation (+71% cumulative since 2003) and adult population growth (~6%) alone cannot explain these increases. 

Aging Households Carrying More Debt Than Ever 

A striking trend: borrowers 60+ years old have experienced 300–500% increases in total debt held. 

In 2003, the 70+ population held only 4% of total U.S. household debt. 
In 2025, that share stands at 10%. This is an extraordinary shift.

This appears to be evidence of structural strain: As people age, they are unable to pay down their debts. Also, wage growth has not kept up with inflation.

Younger households, meanwhile, face increasing difficulty obtaining new credit.


We continue to add additional analytics reports on the Platform. Please visit www.riskspan.com/request-access to request free access. 

As always, please feel free to contact us to discuss or learn more. 


Are You Overpaying for VA Prepay Risk in Ginnie II Pools?

Recent history is showing a persistent (and widening) gap between VA and FHA loan prepayment speeds in Ginnie Mae securities.  

Over the past 33 months, VA 30-year loans are prepaying 40 percent faster than FHA 30-year loans (9.4% CPR for VA vs. Just 6.6% for FHA. VA speeds over this period are ranging from 1.15x to 1.77x FHA speeds. 

This divergence is not incidental. With a median spread between the two of around 230 bps, the difference compounds significantly in modeling cash flow expectations and MBS pricing. 

Why this divergence? 

At least three structural factors contribute to faster VA speeds relative to FHA: 

  1. Borrower Profiles: VA borrowers tend to have higher credit scores (727 average FICO as of Sept 2025) than FHA borrowers (678 average FICO). This makes VA borrowers more likely to refinance quickly when market conditions shift. 
  1. Program Rules: VA’s streamlined refinancing programs are generally more accessible, lowering the cost of refinancing compared to FHA. 
  1. Servicing Practices: The VA loan servicing ecosystem has historically been more efficient, which can accelerate churn relative to FHA pools. 
  1. Larger Loan Size: The average VA loan size is typically larger than the average FHA loan size, making refinancing more impactful for VA borrowers. 

What does this mean for Ginnie II TBA & Custom pools? 

Ginnie II TBAs typically combine both VA and FHA collateral. Most of the loans are FHA, but VA loans still account for a significant share. Because VA loans prepay substantially faster, TBA investors are effectively buying into faster prepayment risk than they would see in a purely FHA pool.  

This risk manifests itself both in the form of shorter duration and more negative convexity exposure. Investors in Ginnie II TBAs may see faster principal return than modeled if VA share is high, especially if the model fails to differentiate between VA and FHA loans, and the additional negative convexity in VA loans will adversely impact OASes, ceteris paribus. 

For investors seeking more tailored exposure, custom Ginnie pools provide a way to isolate or avoid VA prepayment risk. For instance: 

  • FHA-only pools offer slower, more stable prepayment behavior, attractive for investors prioritizing duration stability. 
  • VA-dominant pools may appeal to investors willing to take on higher turnover in exchange for price discounts or optionality in certain market environments. 

Given current market spreads, the differential between VA and FHA speeds is unlikely to narrow materially in the near term. As refinancing incentives fluctuate, VA borrowers will continue to exhibit faster churn than FHA counterparts. 

For Agency portfolio managers and traders, this reality underscores the importance of collateral composition within Ginnie II TBAs. It also highlights the importance of prepayment models capable of recognizing the differences between FHA and VA loans and taking those differences into account when making forecasts. 

Book a demo for RiskSpan’s Edge platform for Agency MBS Traders and Analysts. 


Consumers Under Pressure as Markets Seek Stability: October Models & Markets Recap 

Register here for next month’s call: Thursday, November 20th, 2025, 1 p.m. ET. 

Each month, we host a Models & Markets call to offer our insights into recent model performance, emerging credit risks, and broader economic indicators. This month’s call focused on the impact of the Fed rate cut, key macro indicators and a spotlight on the surging second-lien market. 

Here’s a quick recap in case you missed it. 

(Click here for the entire 23-minute recording or continue reading for a summary.)  

Rates Ease, but Headwinds Persist 

October has brought a modest reprieve in mortgage rates, with the 30-year fixed rate having fallen to approximately 6.2%, the lowest level in nearly a year. 


Affordability remains constrained, however, and long-term headwinds appear far from resolved. Specifically: 

Unemployment remains near 4.2%, and core PCE inflation continues to hover around 2.8%. While steady, this remains above the Fed’s comfort zone. 


Home price growth is slowing nationally, with several major metros posting month-over-month declines. 


Fed Funds futures suggest rates will stay elevated into 2026, with year-end 2025 expectations still in the 3.5–3.75% range. 

Together, these indicators suggest a “higher for longer” policy regime even as the market eyes rate cuts later this year. 

HELOC and Second-Lien Insights: Delinquencies on the Rise 

Leveraging the Equifax Analytic Dataset, a 10% sample of active U.S. credit borrowers with anonymized tradeline-level detail, enables us to dive deep into Home Equity Loans (HELs) and Home Equity Lines of Credit (HELOCs). These asset classes are gaining renewed investor attention as homeowners tap existing equity rather than selling into a high-rate market.

Delinquency rates are trending upward for both HELs and HELOCs, particularly among lower-credit-score borrowers. Aggregated five-year views on page 11 highlight the steady climb, with 600-score cohorts showing the sharpest deterioration. 


These findings echo broader signals of consumer strain visible across other loan products. 

Consumer Balance Sheets Under Pressure

The New York Fed’s Q2 2025 Household Debt and Credit Report underscored the strain many consumers face. Total household debt continues to climb, driven by non-housing credit categories—auto loans, student debt, and revolving balances in particular. 


Credit card and auto loan delinquencies have risen sharply, while mortgage and HELOC performance, though still comparatively solid, are trending downward. Even with stable macro indicators, consumers remain financially stretched. This dynamic is likely to influence credit performance and securitization trends into 2026.


Prepayment Model Updates 

Our prepayment models continue to align well with observed speeds across both Conventional and Ginnie collateral. Lower-coupon collateral (WAC ≤ 5.5%) experienced some deceleration versus forecasts—a function of seasonality and slower housing turnover.  


Higher-coupon cohorts (WAC ≥ 6.0%) reflected more volatility, consistent with recent refinance activity at the margins. 


We continue to add additional analytics reports on the platform. Please visit www.riskspan.com/request-access to request free access. 

Also, please feel free to contact us to discuss or learn more.


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